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ABSTRACT 
Iran is a clear obstacle to U.S. hegemony in the Middle East.  Iran has embraced a 
balancing role to the United States, and has survived (and even thrived) in spite of heavy 
international pressure to adhere to international norms.  This international pressure is 
largely directed against Iran’s lack of transparency in regard to its nuclear program.  Iran 
has faced unilateral U.S. sanctions since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  One of the 
arguments in favor of imposing sanctions on states outside international norms is the 
desire to effect change upon the targeted state.  This thesis explores the relation between 
sanctions imposed on Iran, the rise of the Iranian reform movement and the resurgence of 
conservatives.  By exploring the relationship between the aforementioned variables, this 
thesis seeks to make a determination as to what effect sanctions had on Iran’s internal 
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I. THESIS INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The question of the effectiveness of international sanctions against Iran is widely 
addressed in modern international relations and political science academia.  As sanctions 
play an ever-increasing role as a foreign policy instrument of the United States, there is a 
growing need to understand fully the wide-ranging effects that sanction regimes have on 
the target nation.  Did international sanctions affect Iranian domestic politics, bringing 
about the political reform movement of the 1990s and the subsequent conservative 
resurgence?  This thesis seeks to examine the impact of sanctions on Iran’s domestic 
politics, with particular emphasis on Iran’s political reform movement and the resurgence 
of hardline domestic political elements during the period from the 1997 election of 
President Khatami to the 2005 election of President Ahmadinejad. 
Since the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, the United States has not enjoyed 
regular diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).  Shortly after the 
seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran, sanctions have been in effect by the United 
States against Iran.1  The battle between Iran and the United States has been waged by 
proxy through the Iran-Iraq War, Iranian support for regional terrorist organizations, and 
international diplomatic marginalization of Iran by the United States.  This thesis will 
explore the rise and fall of the Iranian reform movement and the connection between 
international sanctions and resurgent conservative factions in Iran that led to the failure of 
the Iranian reform movement.   
B. IMPORTANCE  
1. Iran’s Regional Significance 
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a key actor in the Middle East due to its vast 
territorial and demographic size, influence with Shi’ite populations in the Middle East, 
and important petroleum reserves.  Sitting astride a geo-strategically important location, 
                                                 
1Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 2008), 168.  
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Iran has been able to exert influence beyond its size due to its potential to upset the 
Middle East.  As the only Shi’a-ruled and only theocratic state in the region, Iran’s 
intentions are difficult to assess due to a lack of transparency and behavior deemed 
contrary to international norms in regard to its nuclear program, support for organizations 
designated as terrorist in nature, and dedication to spreading its Islamic Revolution. 
Historical Arab distrust of Persian interests and Sunni distrust of the Shi’a add to 
regional discord as Iran’s majority Shi’a population majority puts it at odds with the rest 
of the Muslim world, including its nearest neighbors.  Fearing internal discord from their 
own Shi’ite populations, Arabian Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain keep 
constant vigil on Iran and its foreign/domestic politics.  Fearing growing Iranian military 
might, those same Arabian Gulf nations have increasingly turned to the United States to 
balance against Iranian with Middle Eastern states purchasing US military equipment, 
hosting U.S. military missions, and hosting U.S. military forces. 
For the United States, Iran is of particular interest both regionally and 
internationally given Iran’s support for regional terrorist organizations, lack of 
transparency of its nuclear programs, and Iran’s involvement in regional nations - 
especially Iraq and Afghanistan during the continuing conflicts.  Our interest in Iran is 
multi-faceted and in light of the multiple levels of interest, the United maintained 
sanctions against Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and has assumed the role of 
chief policeman in monitoring Iran’s affairs, which has in turn led to increased tensions 
and distrust between the United States and Iran. 
2. Iran’s Worldwide Significance 
Globally, Iran is an important factor in the Middle East’s regional economy and 
the international economy.  Blessed with large oil reserves, the Islamic Republic is a 
large exporter.  Fortunately, for its ideological opponents, Iran does not have enough 
leverage in the world energy market to seriously influence supply or demand, in spite of 
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its position as the fourth largest exporter of crude oil.2  However, Iran’s influence within 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and its proven hydrocarbon 
reserves give Iran significant influence both in the Middle East and internationally. 
Aside from energy resources, Iran has significant international importance due to 
its approach to its nuclear program.  Iran maintains that its nuclear program is for 
peaceful purposes, but is not transparent in its reporting to the IEA leading to distrust of 
Iranian intentions.  Iran’s failure to comply to with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) has brought significant international sanctions against Iran from the United 
Nations and from the United States and EU.3  Seemingly embracing the role of an 
outsider, Iran has maintained an aggressive posture in its stance regarding the Iranian 
nuclear program and has assumed the role of international maverick. 
3. Academic Importance 
American relations with Iran have been decidedly negative since 1979.  Much has 
been written about sanctions and their effectiveness in the Iranian case study; however, I 
feel there is insufficient research on the effects of sanctions on Iran’s domestic politics, 
particularly the rise and fall of the reformist movement and rise of Iranian 
hardline/conservative element.  As economic and political sanctions constitute a 
significant portion of the United States’ efforts towards dealing with “rogue” nations, it 
behooves academia to study the complete effects of those sanctions.  The question 
regarding sanctions on Iran and their effect on Iran’s domestic political situation warrants 
examination due to the critical role that Iran plays in the Middle East, United States 
foreign policy with both Iran and potential future application, and a broader 
understanding of the effects on sanctioning non-normative states. This thesis’ ultimate 
goal is to add to the knowledge of the overall effectiveness of sanctions and of the 
sanctions against Iran in particular. 
                                                 
2CIA World Fact Book, Country Comparisons: Oil - Proved Reserves.  January 1, 2010.  Accessed 
November 10, 2011.   https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2178rank.html. 
3Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for Failure to Halt Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously 
Adopting Resolution 173.  UN  Security Council 5612th Meeting (December 23, 2006).  Accessed 
November 15, 2011.  http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Any research involving Iran is a difficult undertaking due to the lack of 
transparency in government.  While Iran has active journalism, at first glance, that 
journalism is generally anti-Western although Iranian journalism remains an excellent 
source of open-source information.  Although Iran is a relatively modern nation, 
academic and intellectual freedom in Iran appears to be at odds with Iran’s theocratic 
makeup.  Information on Iran’s economy, domestic politics, and even government 
structure is difficult to come by due to lack of transparency.  That lack of information 
combined with the opacity of Iranian academia leaves large gaps in public knowledge 
regarding Iran in general.  As a result, Western information on Iran must be developed 
largely from an external points of view relying largely on information gleaned from open 
source reporting, academic modeling based on facts and figures released by Iran, the 
knowledge of Iran experts, and what little Iranian scholarly work that is disseminated 
abroad. 
This thesis will be evaluated in the context of deductions made from all the 
empirical evidence gathered from the aforementioned sources.  This thesis will first 
examine the rise of the reform movement within Iran and then examine the reform 
movement’s decline, attempting to link that decline with the reemergence of Iranian 
domestic hardline/conservative elements given fresh life by the effects of international 
sanctions.  This thesis will examine a number of hypotheses: 
1. HYPOTHESIS #1: 
Sanctions against Iran did not significantly affect the rise of the reform 
movement, but created the economic framework by which hardline elements would 
later gain power 
The development of the Iranian reform movement in the 1990s was not a direct 
consequence of sanctions, as sanctions against Iran at that time were unilaterally imposed 
by the United States and not decidedly effective due to lack of enforcement capability.  
However, the economic sanctions did predominately target the military-industrial 
complex creating a domestic Iranian demand for domestically produced military 
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products.  Conservative elements within Iran, namely the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, 
capitalized on that demand by securing footholds in the economic development of the 
Iranian economy that would develop into political power. 
2. HYPOTHESIS #2: 
Conservative elements within Iran’s governmental structure conducted 
internationally unacceptable behavior, seemingly tempting additional sanctions that 
could only serve to strengthen conservative centers of powers 
Threatened by the surging reform sentiment, conservative elements within the 
Iranian political system continued and even increased investment in both terrorist 
organizations and its nuclear program.  Not only did these efforts undermine reformist 
efforts to liberalize Iran’s political structure but also increased international displeasure 
with Iran and brought about renewed sanctions.  Additionally, conservative elements, like 
the IRGC, Shi’a clergy, and Supreme Leader-appointed institutions, reinforced their hold 
on their remaining centers of power.  The perception is thus created that Iranian 
reactionaries intentionally sought to widen the ideological rift between Iran and the West. 
3. HYPOTHESIS #3: 
Sanctions discredited Iranian reformers’ attempts to increasingly 
“westernize” Iran’s political structure, leading to conservative backlash 
In the wake of Khatami’s election as President of Iran in 1997, there was an 
easing of American sanctions.4  After an initial period of détente, it became increasingly 
apparent that Iran was still supporting terrorist organizations and possibly pursuing 
nuclear weapons—issues pressed forward by the conservative elements within Iran’s 
domestic politics which reformers were either unwilling or unable to curtail due to the 
political structure of Iran and the primacy of the clerics.  So with the election of George 
W Bush, the sanctions were fully reinstated.  With the reinstatement of the sanctions and 
increased scrutiny by international agencies into Iran’s affairs, especially its nuclear  
 
                                                 
4Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 189.  
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program, reformers lost prestige amongst both the population and the clerics who 
ultimately rule in Iran.  This loss of confidence in the reformist cause ultimately led to its 
downfall. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The issues of sanctions against Iran and the rise and fall of the progressive 
movement in Iran have individually been dissected intensively since each subject came to 
the forefront of discourse regarding Iran.  However, scholars tend to evaluate the effects 
of the sanctions in terms of their effectiveness in altering undesirable state behavior, not 
always paying close attention to the effects of sanctions on the internal domestic polity of 
the sanctioned nation.5  Similarly, academic coverage on the Iranian progressive 
movement and the conservative resurgence is not widely evaluated in the context as 
results stemming from sanctions.  This literature review will survey several of the 
prominent scholarly works regarding the historical effectiveness of sanctions in multiple 
cases studies, effectiveness of sanctions on Iran and the Iranian progressive movement 
and subsequent conservative resurgence in order to establish that a gap exist in the 
scholarly knowledge linking the two issues together. 
In evaluating the effectiveness of sanctions and how they can affect a country’s 
internal politics, several case studies have extensively proven the worth of sanctions.  
However, this review will focus on Libya, Iran, and South Africa.  Libya and Iran are 
interesting studies as both nations experienced similar sanctions, especially sanctions 
imposed by the United States, yet the outcome in each country has been vastly different.  
The South African study is interesting and relevant for comparison to this thesis’ Iranian 
focus as it is a clear case where international sanctions and divestment affected the 
domestic politics of a nation. 
                                                 
5See: Alfoneh’s “How Intertwined Are the Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s Economy,”  Torbat’s 
“Impacts of the US Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran,” and  Katzman’s CRS report on Iranian 
sanctions as examples of scholarly focus on the external effects of sanctions on Iran, with minimal attention 
on internal/domestic effects.  
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1. Sanctions as Tools in Bringing about Domestic Change 
a. Libya 
In December 2003, Muammar al-Qaddafi publicly announced Libya’s 
plans to disband its weapons of mass destruction programs (WMDs).  This announcement 
marked the first step in Libya’s quest for normalization.  The question is, why did Libya 
seek to normalize relations with the international community? 
Negative U.S.-Libyan relations date to the beginning of the Qaddafi 
regime in 1969.  Libya’s isolation from the West and support for terrorism starting in the 
late 1970s are the main reasons for Libya’s status in the international community.6  Yahia 
Zoubir points to the Libya’s “characteriz[ation] as an outlaw state” and the United States 
policy of regime change as major sources of Libyan animosity towards the United States.  
Zoubir further maintains that Libya’s in the 1980s was  internally by the rise of domestic 
Islamist militant groups and beginning of economic troubles, caused in part by 
international sanctions and by the world economy.7  Similarly, Jonathan B. Schwartz in 
his article “Dealing with a ‘Rogue State’: The Libya Precedent” he credits sanctions 
against Libya as a result of the Lockerbie Bombing as the main reason that Libya’s 
seeking of normalization due to domestic financial pressure.8  The majority of the 
literature on the Libyan normalization is unified in the assertion that economic sanctions 
created intense domestic economic incentive for Qaddafi to alter Libya’s internationally 
unacceptable behavior.  However, even though economic and political disaffection in 
Libya arose partially because of sanctions, there was no drastic shift in Libya’s internal 
politics as Qaddafi maintained a firm grip on the fragmented levers of power. 
b. South Africa 
The South African case study is of great applicability to the Iranian focus 
of this thesis in that in the South African case there is an evident linkage between 
                                                 
6Yahia H. Zoubir, “The United States and Libya: From Confrontation to Normalization,” Middle East 
Policy Vol 13, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 49. 
7Ibid., 50. 
8Jonathan B. Schwartz, “Dealing with a ‘Rogue State’: The Libya Precedent,” The American Journal 
of International Law, 101, no. 3 (July 2007): 555–556, 558.  
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economic/political sanctions and a change in the targeted nation’s domestic polity.  It is 
excellent empirical proof that sanctions can work as intended to bring about desired 
change, even on a national level as this thesis contends. 
Literature regarding the cause collapse of apartheid is not unanimous but 
there is broad agreement that international sanctions at least hastened, if not outright 
precipitated, the end of apartheid in South Africa.  Author Patti Waldmeir claims that as 
early as 1978, South Africa faced increased trouble accessing international financial 
markets, having “to pay premium rates on short-term lending” cause in large part by the 
sanctions in place against the South African regime.9  Additionally, she credits sanctions 
with increasing political instability within South Africa by additional sanctions enacted 
by the U.S. Congress in 1986, damaging the “psyche of white South Africans” and 
further limiting the state’s ability to pay for mounting costs of apartheid.10  Alternatively, 
Anton Lowenberg maintains that it was “inherent weaknesses” in the apartheid system 
where the reason for the end of apartheid but acknowledges the domestic political 
situation was made worse by the worsening financial situation.11,12  In any event, 
international sanctions in South Africa led directly to the exhaustion of minority white 
rule, and the political empowerment of the majority blacks.  Sanctions provide to be 
effective tools in forcing domestic policy in a state as had not been seen before.  This 
leads to the question of why we have not seen similar change in Iran. 
c. Iran 
Literature on the role of sanctions in affecting Iran’s domestic politics is 
unclear and unsettled.  While there have been in recent years open source accounts of 
disaffection amongst the Iranian population at the cost of goods due to the sanctions, 
there has been no intensive scholarly linkage between the effects of sanctions and the rise 
                                                 
9Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa 
(Rutgers University Press, New Jersey 1997), 23. 
10Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, 56–57.  
11Anton Lowenberg, “Why South Africa’s Apartheid Economy Failed,” Contemporary Economic 
Policy XV (July 1997):  62 
12Ibid., 66–67. 
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of the Iranian progressive movement or how sanctions may have affected the resurgence 
of Iranian conservative elements.  While no firm linkage between sanctions and the rise 
of the progressive and re-rise of conservative movements has been established, there is 
sufficient literature to evaluate the effects of the sanctions in general. 
A Congressional Research Service report claims multinational sanctions 
are having desired effect as U.S. and allied efforts to isolate Iran economically 
continue.13  Cited are increased Iranian transactional costs to participate in international 
finance and increased costs for Iranian businesses in completing international 
transactions, which is leading to increased disaffection amongst the civilian sector for 
Iranian governmental policies.14  Additionally, the loss of tax revenue due to continued 
international disinvestment from Iran and announced eliminations of key energy 
subsidies within Iran threaten to increase public disaffection with the Iranian 
government.15  By comparison to the CRS report, Akbar Torbat maintains that both trade 
and financial sanctions have succeeded in damaging the Iranian economy “[however,] the 
political effect of the sanctions in terms of achieving their objectives ... has been 
minimal.”16  Torbat maintains that stronger economic sanctions must be implemented if 
serious political change is sought by the United States.17  Additionally, Torbat believes 
that while sanctions are preferable to military action, in the case of Iran due to the 
strength of the theocratic-political apparatus the current sanctions might not be sufficient 
to change Iranian policy.18 
Torbat’s assertion that stronger sanctions would be required to affect 
political change is one of the few references in the literature regarding the effectiveness 
of sanctions that evaluates the potential of sanctions as tools in forcing internal political 
                                                 
13U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), by 
Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report RL2071 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and 
Publishing, June 1, 2006), I. 
14Ibid., 50. 
15Ibid., 51–52. 
16Akbar E. Torbat, “Impacts of the US Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran,” The World Economy 




change.  As show by this brief overview of several disparate, but similar, case studies in 
the application of sanctions a key difference between Libya, South Africa and Iran is 
state institutional structures and reliance of the targeted economy on international 
markets.  While all three economies were reliant on international markets, their domestic 
institutions differed.  Sanctions in Libya’s case did not affect domestic political change 
because Libya’s domestic institutions did not include a mechanism for elective change 
and so change had to be forced from the leadership.  Alternatively, South Africa’s 
institutions were designed to be responsive to popular sentiment through voting even if 
that right was severely limited.  In South Africa, change was brought about as the voting 
public realized that continued internationally unacceptable behavior was a detriment to 
the nation.  Similarly, Iran also has domestic institutions capable of ushering in change, 
but while Torbat claims that the effects of sanctions have not been sufficient to force 
political change, this thesis will attempt to provide the linkage between economic 
sanctions and their effects on Iran’s reform movement and resurgence of the 
conservatives in a manner which current literature regarding Iran’s reform movement 
does not satisfy.  
(1) Rise and Fall of the Iranian Progressive Movement.  The early 
1990s found Iran in a precarious situation.  Social stagnation and economic woes 
continually mounted and the elected leadership of Iran under President Rafsanjani 
declared that it was time for the economy to begin modernization.19  Following 
Rafsanjani’s 1989 election, the Iranian government moved aggressively to improve 
economic conditions but in the face of declining world oil prices and enhanced US 
sanctions against Iran, the Iranian population grew increasingly disaffected with the 
status quo.20  That disaffection, and calls for increased political reforms, led to the 
election of Seyyed Mohammed Khatami who advocated a better civil society and reform  
 
 
                                                 
19Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 183. 
20Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 184–185. 
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of domestic policies.21,22  There is ample literature covering the rise of Khatami and the 
reform movement, but little links the effects of sanctions specifically to the rise of the 
reform movement but rather link sanctions to the economic situation in Iran, which in 
turn fueled Khatami’s domestic agenda.  Where there is more linkage between sanctions 
and Iranian domestic politics is the resurgence of conservative elements in the early 21st 
century. 
While Khatami swept into office promising change, he was still 
subordinate to the Supreme Leader, which placed limitations on what he could 
accomplish.23  Still, his election led to a brief period of détente with the United States and 
American sanctions were fractionally eased.24  Adding to the complexity in Khatami’s 
attempt to reform Iranian politics was the fact that conservative elements retained 
considerable influence and control in various institutions of the Iranian state included the 
military, media, the clergy, and “major economic organizations”.25  Those reactionary 
forces continuously sought to limit the extent of reforms due to a fear that the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s governmental structure might not survive reform in such a way that 
would benefit conservative interests.  Literature regarding the continued influence of 
conservatives following the election of Khatami through the reemergence of 
conservatives to the forefront of Iranian political leadership does provide more overt 
linkage between the effects of sanctions and the power held by conservative elements.  
Of particular interests to scholars is the role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) as guardian of the Islamic state and as a bastion of conservatism within Iran.  Ali 
Alfoneh and other scholars have pointed out the constitutional role that the IRGC has 
played in Iranian politics since the Islamic Revolution and points out the conservative 
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thinking of the IRGC’s leadership.26  Other scholars have pointed out the role that 
sanctions have played in enabling the IRGC to exert discretional influence over the whole 
of Iran.  A recent thesis written at the Naval Postgraduate School by Robert McKnight II 
focuses on what the author terms the “militarization of Iran.”27  My thesis will expand on 
McKnight’s exploration into the influence of the IRGC by exploring the political 
implications rather than the purely military implications, seeking to link sanctions and 
their effects to resurgence of the conservative movement in Iran and the subsequent 
downfall of the Iranian reform movement. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Due to the unique and complex domestic politics and political system of Iran and 
the unique nature of sanctions against Iran, the method of study best suited for this thesis 
is a single case study approach.  As there is really no comparison for the Iranian case, this 
thesis will explore the evolution of sanctions against Iran and developments in Iranian 
domestic politics since the 1979 Islamic Revolution attempting to establish correlation 
where supported by the evidence.  At times, there will be elements of comparative study 
when analyzing the effects of sanctions in an attempt to understand where similar 
sanctions regimes can have different results.  However, this comparative study will be 
limited in nature to sanctions and their impact on the targeted nation’s domestic political 
situation. 
Sources used in this thesis include peer-reviewed regional and international 
journals, reports generated by research institutes, reports generated by professional world 
organizations, governmental reports and press releases.  Information of Iran’s economy 
and domestic politics is best gathered from regional journals such as the Middle East 
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Journal, Middle East Economic Digest, and Middle East Quarterly and from 
newsmagazines like The Economist.  Ideally, this thesis would rely totally on peer-
reviewed scholarly articles, but when studying a society like Iran one must consider all 
possible information.  Aside from peer-reviewed journals and newsmagazine articles, 
several research institutes such as the RAND Institute produce excellently researched 
reports on Iran.  Reports produced by institutions like the World Bank, IMF, IAEA, WTO 
enable evaluation the economic status of Iran despite a dearth of information from 
official Iranian sources.  United States government reports and sources, while potentially 
biased due to political appointments, are also excellent sources of information especially 
as related to sanctions and their effects.  While Congressional Research Service reports 
are not generally considered scholarly in nature, they do provide excellent open source 
information.  Lastly, while published books might present dated or static information 
compared to periodicals and journals, they still provide a wealth of knowledge that serves 
to round out our general background knowledge of Iran. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The focus of this thesis makes division of analysis into strictly chronological 
periods difficult, in turn making thesis organization problematic.  To address the question 
of the effects of sanctions on Iranian domestic politics and the Iranian reform movement, 
this thesis will include an introductory chapter, four chapters of research and analysis and 
a concluding chapter.  The first chapter of research and analysis will be a historical 
review of Iranian sanctions since the 1979 Islamic Revolution through end of the Iran-
Iraq War, focusing on the effects of said sanctions on Iran’s economy and domestic 
politics.  The second chapter of research and analysis will address the development of 
Iranian domestic politics and growing influence exerted by conservative factions in 
economic matters following the Iran-Iraq War through the election of President Khatami 
in 1997, with cross-referencing to sanctions, their implementation and effects, and Iranian 
conservatives’ growing hold on the Iranian economic levers of power.  The third chapter 
of research and analysis will cover the reform movement in action during the presidency 
of President Khatami, paying special attention to the causes for growing mistrust between 
Iran and West, as well as the international scrutiny and the domestic disillusionment that 
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brought about the fall of the reform movement in 2005.  The fourth chapter of research 
and analysis will focus on the effects of sanctions that aided hardline Iranian elements 
like the IRGC in gaining economic and political influence within Iran, as well as the 
general conservative resurgence leading to the 2005 election of President Ahmadinejad.  
The concluding chapter will summarize the linkage between sanctions and Iranian 
domestic politics, and will present conclusions regarding the effectiveness of sanctions on 
Iran with special emphasis on their effect on Iran’s domestic political polity in the context 
of U.S. foreign policy objectives. 
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II. BEGINNING SANCTIONS: IRAN FOLLOWING THE 
ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 
A. U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE 1979 REVOLUTION 
The scope of this thesis begins with the period following the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution, which began on a negative note with a falling out between the United States 
and the new Iranian government.  The tone for relations between the United States and 
the future Islamic Republic of Iran was set long before the 1979 Islamic Revolution with 
the U.S.-supported overthrow of Mossadaq and U.S. support for the Shah’s oppressive 
regime.28  The outlook for future relations between Iran and the United States did not 
improve after the Islamic Revolution thanks to the United States’ decision to grant the 
deposed Shah entrance to the United States for medical care and refusing to return the 
Shah to Iran to face trial.29  The history of American interference in Iran’s internal affairs 
coupled with continued American support for the Shah was sufficient to negatively 
prejudice both the Iranian revolutionary authorities and the Iranian population as a whole.  
The Islamic student takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the subsequent holding 
of hostages soured American views on Iran.  Unrecognized by the U.S. government in the 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s handling of the hostage situation was the fact that the Ayatollah’s 
government did not yet exert full control of the Iranian state, a failure which prevented 
any application of leverage to either improve ties with the new Iranian regime or to 
negotiate a hostage release.30  In response to the hostage situation in Iran, the United 
States government placed the first of many international sanctions against Iran with the 
issuance of Proclamation 4702, which invoked Presidential powers under the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 to block Iranian oil imports.31  Proclamation 4702 was followed 
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by Executive Order (EO) 12170, which froze all Iranian governmental assets within the 
United States.  EO 12205 & 12211 issued in April 1979 prohibited American companies 
from investing or participating in Iranian industry and limited direct Iranian access to 
American markets, increasing transactional costs in acquiring American goods, restricted 
American travel to Iran, and prohibited other direct financial transfers besides family 
remittances.32  These limitations did not severely inhibit or inconvenience the Iranian 
economy on a macro scale, as the sanctions placed by EO 12205 and 12211 were 
unilateral American measures and not enforceable on other nations’ economic 
interactions with Iran.   
The initial American sanctions against Iran were retaliatory and coercive, but 
were not designed to affect fundamental domestic change within the target nation.  The 
sanctions effected by Proclamation 4702, EOs 12170, 12205 and 12211 were designed to 
achieve a single goal, that of the release of the American hostages.  The sanctions were 
primarily punitive measures designed to be rescinded upon release of the American 
hostages.  In the aftermath of the hostage release, the Executive Orders sanctioning Iran 
were superseded by Executive Orders 12276-12284 in accordance with the agreement 
struck between the United States and Iran under the Algiers Accords.33  While the 
sanctions were officially lifted and the United States had obligated itself to “not to 
intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs,” newly 
elected President Reagan opted to maintain the prohibition on direct military sales to Iran.  
However, even in the aftermath of the sanctions, the hostage crisis and Islamic 
Revolution, there was still the hope in some sectors of American politics that Iran might 
eventually return to the United States’ sphere of influence.34 
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However short-lived the immediate sequestration of Iranian property was, the 
perception of American economic enmity against Iran served the Iranian clerics purpose 
to further build upon popular dislike of America stemming from years of support for the 
Shah and the overthrow of Mossadaq.  It is important to note that the sanctions emplaced 
by the United States played a relatively minor role in persuading Iran to release the 
hostages nor were the sanctions coordinated with any foreign government, showing that 
the key to any effective sanctions regime is international support.  Given the level of 
vitriol exhibited by the Iranian public and the stubbornness of the Iranian revolutionary 
clergy, it is not inconceivable that Iran only gave up the hostages because it was no 
longer in Iran’s best interest to retain them in light of global disapproval.  The most 
noticeable effects of the American sanctions were the perception of American enmity and 
distrust that the sanctions presented to the Iranian public and its neighbors. 
B. SANCTIONS AND THEIR EFFECT DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
1. Effect of Sanctions on Iraq’s Willingness to go to War 
A second-order effect of the sanctions was the unplanned and unanticipated effect 
it would have on Saddam Hussein’s decision to attack Iran.  Prior to the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution, the United States had been Iran’s primary international partner in both 
international relations and international security.  Iraq, due to its strategic position, had 
long been a buffer zone between the Arab world and the Persian/Iranian nation.  Where 
the Soviet Union had been Iraq’s primary benefactor due to Cold War politics and the 
United States was Iran’s, the sudden change in the geostrategic situation following the 
Islamic Revolution represented by Iran’s loss of American patronage was attractive to 
Iraq for the opportunity to settle territorial disputes, possibility of acquiring economic 
resources, and acquiring regional prestige.35  While not the sole, or even the most 
important, factor in Saddam Hussein’s willingness to go to war, the sanctions and 
subsequent perception of Iran’s international isolation undoubtedly served as a factor in 
the start of the Iran-Iraq War.   
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The continued American refusal to directly sell arms to Iran and direct/indirect 
support for the Iraqi war effort, as well as other anti-Iranian measures taken during the 
Iran-Iraq War, directly contributed to the continued Iraqi ability to prosecute a war 
against a numerically superior opponent.  The majority of Iran’s military equipment at the 
onset of the Iran-Iraq War was of American manufacture, thus requiring American 
munitions and parts to be effective.  Saddam Hussein could see that Iran’s military, 
industrial, and economic power would only grow as the Islamic Revolution took 
complete hold over Iran and would eventually spread to other parts of the Middle East, 
including Iraq.  Doubtlessly, Saddam Hussein viewed the Iranian material and personnel 
situations as a boon to his dream of Iraqi regional supremacy that might not be the case 
once the Iranian clergy secured their revolution.  However, more important than the 
effects of Iran’s isolation on Iraqi war decision-making is the affect that the continued 
American opposition to the Islamic Republic in general and the weapons embargo in 
particular represented. 
2. Effects of Sanctions on Iran’s Economy and Military Industry 
Following the fall of the Shah, Khomeini stood as the only source of power.  Any 
potential alternative to an Islamic form of government would have had to rise from the 
middle class, the merchant class, of Iran.  However, that middle class was itself 
fragmented both politically and religiously, having only a strong sense of nationalism in 
common and absent strong cohesive leadership from its own ranks, the middle class 
defaulted to following the leadership that offered the most stability.36  The merchant class 
saw the American embargo as a direct threat to their way of life and so embraced the new 
Islamic regime.  This observation is not to imply that had the United States not placed the 
embargo that the merchant class would have acted differently but rather as explanation 
for why the politically fragmented merchant class supported Khomeini even before the 
threat represented by Iraq’s invasion.  For the Islamic leaders of Iran, the war with Iraq 
presented the opportunity to consolidate power and determine the future course for Iran.  
By framing the struggle with Iraq as both a nationalistic and religious struggle, the 
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revolutionary leadership was able to suborn any domestic issues in Iran to the ongoing 
crisis.37  The economic isolation of its former primary trading partner provided the new 
leaders of the Islamic Republic with an external threat against which to rally the populace 
and an excuse for any deprivations.38   
A significant impact of the initial American embargo is that it ended Iranian 
access to American financial markets and ended the long military-industrial ties between 
Iran and the United States, forcing Iran to in the future rely more on its indigenous 
military-industrial complex and other foreign military material suppliers.  Where the 
Iranian military under the Shah embraced foreign military suppliers, with the new 
restrictions on international transactions, the Iranian armed forces began a trek towards 
indigenous military production that continues to this day.  Combined with later sanctions 
and political dominance of conservative factions within the Islamic Republic such as the 
Revolutionary Guard, large segments of Iranian domestic industry would fall under the 
control of conservative elements of the Islamic Republic that would fuel both their 
influence and ability to oppose any political liberalization.  In the short term, the Iranian 
leadership took the opportunity afforded by the domestic economic crisis created by the 
Iran-Iraq War and by the American sanctions to nationalize key businesses in Iran.  
Shortly following the fall of the Shah, Ayatollah Khomeini moved to consolidate 
economic control of Iran.  Interesting of note is that without the economic policies of the 
Shah that rapidly turned Iran into a modern industrial nation, the Islamic Revolution 
might have never come about, or at least have been delayed, or even been defeated by 
Iraq.  Nonetheless, the Islamic revolutionaries who ultimately gained power following the 
revolution did not have a defined economic agenda other than to redefine the purpose of 
the economy which was according to the 1979 Iranian constitution became “not an ‘end 
in itself’ but only a ‘means’ of moving toward God.”39  To this end, all major industrial 
ventures, all financial sectors, and thousands of privately held businesses were 
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nationalized and administered either directly by the state or by state-administered 
foundations (bonyads).40  It was during this period following the revolution, but before 
the Iran-Iraq War, that the Iranian state established the framework by which conservative 
revolutionary elements would hold considerable control over Iran’s domestic economy.  
One key portion of the Iranian domestic economy that was to play a role was arms 
production, especially in light of the American embargo on direct military sales.  Very 
soon after the nationalization of the Iranian military-industrial complex, steps were taken 
to begin Iran’s march down the road of indigenous military production and Iranian arms 
acquisition was diversified, showing the limited effectiveness of the American 
sanctions.41 
As part of the American arms embargo against Iran, no American companies 
could directly sell weapons to Iran.  However, American companies were still free to sell 
weapons to other third parties who found that the Iranians were willing to pay a premium 
for American arms as the Iran-Iraq War heated up.  As American realization grew on the 
futility of unilateral enforcement of arms embargoes, there was a desire in the Regan 
Administration to further curtail transshipment of American arms to Iran.  This desire 
was realized by Operation Staunch, a State Department initiative to actively seek the 
support of various third party nations in the Arab world and allied nations such as South 
Korea and Italy in abstaining from supplying the Iranians.42  However, proof of the 
limitations of sanctions, especially unilateral sanctions, exists in the Iran-Contra Affair in 
which the sanctioning nation itself broke the embargo against Iran. 
The Iran-Contra Affair is a thesis subject in and of itself; however, it is relevant in 
exploring while reviewing the effectiveness of sanction against Iran, because the scandal 
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shows how a sanctioned nation can circumvent embargoes when leverage of any sort 
exists.  In the Iran-Contra Affair, the leverage was both the United States’ foreign policy 
priorities in both the Middle East and Central America and the hostages taken by Iranian-
affiliated terrorist organizations.  In an attempt to both engage Iran, as characterized by 
President Reagan, and secure the release of the American hostages, elements within the 
United States sold American weapons to Iran through Israeli connections.43  In the end, 
proceeds from the weapon sales to Iran were proven to have illegally funded American 
support for Nicaraguan rebels and the weapons themselves went to the Iranian 
government.  Sanctions tend to encourage corruption in their implementation, and the 
American embargo on Iran is no different.44   
Ultimately, American sanctions had little to no effect on Iran itself, aside from 
slightly raising transactional costs on foreign military procurement.  Any negative effects 
on the Iranian economy were a result of reorganization in the Islamic Revolution’s 
aftermath and not sanctions as the central Iranian planned economy faltered, changes in 
private land ownership affected agricultural production and basic government 
bureaucracies were overhauled.45  In terms of military industry, the global arms industry 
and Iran’s own burgeoning military-industrial complex stepped in to neutralize many of 
the negative effects of the expanded American efforts to hamper Iran’s effort to procure 
war materials.  By the end of the war, Iran had surpassed several traditional arms 
manufacturing nations and was able to produce indigenous weapons systems to replace 
American arms.46 Iran’s ability to stave off military disaster against the well-organized 
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Iraqi war machine and eventually take the offensive is excellent evidence on the 
limitations of sanctions as an instrument of forced change.  Similarly, the pressure 
created in part by the American sanctions gave rise to the Iranian indigenous arms 
industry that was later to be coopted and serve as a power base for conservative Iranian 
elements like the IRGC. 
3. Iran’s Domestic Political Situation 
A common linkage between revolutionary states is that a post-revolutionary 
conflict strengthens the revolutionary regime.47  Such is the case in Iran, with the Iran-
Iraq war allowing Iranian revolutionary authorities to consolidate their bases of power, 
eliminate potential rivals.  When no external threat to the state exists, the leaders of a 
state have to pay special attention to societal problems and take action to minimize any 
complications that might threaten the stability of domestic politics.  The attention 
required to ensure stability in a post-revolutionary state is even greater.  Affecting the 
domestic political situation in Iran following the fall of the shah was the fragmented 
political scene, external pressures from the United States and regional neighbors, and The 
economy of Iran during the 1980s was threatened by fluctuating oil prices, the Iran-Iraq 
War effect on oil exports, and economic isolation from its previous prime trading partner, 
the United States. 
Even before the start of the Iran-Iraq War, the direction that Iran’s domestic 
politics was to take was in question.  Grand Ayatollah Khomeini had advocated for a 
democratically elected leadership and at first supported the election of President 
Banisadr.  However, disagreement over the direction that the Islamic Republic was to 
take, especially in regard to the powers of the presidency, forced a rift between Banisadr 
and Khomeini.  The Iranian Constitution adopted in 1979 established a thoroughly 
theocratically-led democracy, ignoring the political resistance of secular elements of 
Iranian politics.  Disaffected by the course upon which Grand Ayatollah Khomeini had 
set Iran upon, Banisadr colluded in a failed effort to overthrow the Iranian government 
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with the Mojahedin, a secular Marxist opposition political group originally allied with 
Khomeini in the Shah’s overthrow.48  The uprising was brutally crushed by Islamic 
militias loyal to the Grand Ayatollah and the Revolutionary Guard, securing the Islamic 
Revolution and the Islamic Constitution.  What this episode tells us is that political 
discord and fragmentation existed in Iraq before and after the Islamic Revolution, making 
it difficult to attribute future political realignments to any single external or internal 
factor, such as sanctions or economic pressure.  Additionally, the brutal suppression of 
the uprising demonstrates both the dedication of the Revolutionary Guards, which was 
later rewarded by subsequent measures taken after the Iran-Iraq War to secure the 
Revolutionary Guards place in domestic politics by way of economic promotion. 
As the war against Iraq continued, Khomeini and the Iranian government 
discovered the breathing room afforded by an external existential threat to the state and 
the popularity of Khomeini.  The Basij militias and the Revolutionary Guard solidified 
their positions with both the Iranian populace and the clerical/political elites as saviors of 
the nation.  This trust from both the ruling class and the masses allowed the conservative 
militant factions represented by the Basijis and the IRGC to exert enormous influence in 
the political and economic arenas after the Iran-Iraq War.  This influence garnered from 
the Iran-Iraq War period was the foundation of subsequent national influence following 
the death of Khomeini and the resurgence of reformist factions.  However, victory and 
subsequent political influence was not really a factor as Iran fought for a victory, which 
Khomeini had decided, was to be an unconditional victory.  The failure to settle the Iran-
Iraq War, with concessions from Iraq was a mistake and was primarily responsible for the 
severe deterioration of the Iranian economy after the 1982 Iraqi offer for peace based on 
the 1975 Algiers Agreement.  Regardless of the damage to the Iranian economy, even 
after the war Khomeini refused to admit that continuation of the war against Iraq had 
been a mistake claiming that it would have been a failure in Iran’s religious duty.  This 
stubbornness showing that like in his economic principles, domestic politics and foreign 
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affairs of the Iranian Islamic Republic must suborn themselves to religious duty.49  This 
stance is a great indicator of Iran’s moral strength and source of philosophical ideology 
for conservatives within Iran.   
C. CONCLUSION 
Important to note in the study of Iran’s domestic politics during the Iran-Iraq War 
is the near-complete lack of influence of sanctions to affect either Iran’s internal or 
foreign affairs.  There was no internal debate on foreign policy changes or for 
rapprochement with the United States, but rather a dogged determination to defeat Iraq 
and spread the Islamic Revolution.  However, an argument is made for the effectiveness 
of sanctions in Iran’s decision to end the war in light of UN sanctions imposed against 
Iran in 1988 for refusing ceasefire terms, sanctions which were echoed by the United 
States with enhanced sanctions including prohibition against all Iranian imports (with the 
exception of oil).50  Faced with continued war and economic struggles on the home front, 
Khomeini decided to end the war but the Iranian government placed the blame for the 
lack of total victory on the United States’ interference and support for Iraq.51   
The United States was made the scapegoat onto which the Iranian elites deflected 
criticism from themselves and their chosen champion, the IRGC, leaving the conservative 
elements that would later stymie reform efforts relatively unblemished by both the 
Iranian failures during the war with Iraq and the faltering economy.  The clerical and 
political conservatives were strengthened by their ability to purge Iran of revisionists, 
recidivists, and counterrevolutionaries afforded by the external threats.  Iran’s greatest 
success during the Iran-Iraq War period was its ability to survive in spite of 
internal/external threats and easily survived American sanctions.52  The sanctions’ lack of 
effectiveness during this period support the first and, to a lesser extent, the second 
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hypothesis of this thesis, in that sanctions did not noticeably affect any domestic political 
reform movements but enabled the basic economic and political framework wherein 
conservative elements would entrench themselves.  A stronger threat to Khomeini’s state 
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III. LIFE AFTER KHOMEINI: NEW SANCTIONS AND THE RISE 
OF THE REFORMISTS 
A. DEATH OF AN ICON: RESTRUCTURING IRANIAN DOMESTIC 
POLITICS AFTER KHOMEINI 
Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s death on June 5, 1989, was a major intersection in 
both Iranian and Middle East history.  Khomeini was an iconic figure who had dominated 
Iran’s domestic politics, Middle Eastern regional affairs, and commanded 
disproportionate American interest for over a decade.  The period following the death of 
Khomeini presented an opportunity for potential reformists within Iran to rise and attempt 
reforms of Iranian government but for the near decade of political austerity characterized 
by repression and purges of moderate or liberal politics within Iran.  The decade of 
political repression left rudderless any nascent moderate political movement, but need for 
reform was evident even to Khomeini’s conservative followers in recognition of Iran’s 
economic, social, and political realities.53  Any authority figure that would step into the 
power vacuum left by Khomeini’s death would invariably not command the same support 
that Khomeini had.  Additionally, foreign affairs challenges needed to be addressed, 
including lingering American economic sanctions.  Change would happen in Iran, but 
whether the country would end up markedly more conservative or more liberal was very 
much in question.  As one reviews the evidence and literature, it becomes increasingly 
evident that the growth of the Iranian reform movement following the death of Khomeini 
was not significantly affected by external sanctions but rather as an amalgam of factors 
ranging from oil economic conditions to internal Iranian political factionalism to the 
weariness of the Iranian populace. 
1. The Rise of Ayatollah Khamenei 
Following the exhausting war with Iran, Khomeini and the conservative 
establishment sought to deflect any criticism of the political and religious elite by 
targeting domestic dissidents.  The bloodbath that occurred in 1988 caused a split 
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between Khomeini and his heir-apparent, Ayatollah Montazeri, who was the next most 
senior religious figure in Shia Islam and close to Khomeini.  Montazeri’s public 
disapproval of the methods by which the Iranian government was repressing dissidents 
led Khomeini to remove Montazeri as his heir.54  With the removal of Montazeri and 
unable to find a suitable candidate of the requisite elevated religious scholarly 
credentials, Khomeini had the constitution amended to remove the requirement that the 
Supreme Leader be an ayatollah.  Upon Khomeini’s death, it was then-President 
Khamenei that was elected by the Assemble of Experts partly due to Rafsanjani’s efforts 
and perhaps even the political establishment’s belief that Khamenei’s dependency on 
them for legitimacy might make Khamenei more pliant.55  A weak Supreme Leader was 
what some conservative elites may have wished for, but Khamenei set about ensuring his 
positional authority by creating a system of “commissars” or personal representatives that 
he appointed to every Iranian institution.56  Khamenei realized that his authority at the 
beginning was not as secure as Khomeini’s authority and set about securing it, and would 
exercise considerable influence from his election as Supreme Leader to the present day. 
With the elevation of Khamenei to Supreme Leader and Rafsanjani’s election as 
President, a period of liberalization began in Iran as Khamenei and Rafsanjani propelled 
Iran down the road of reform based on economic reforms, governmental reforms, and 
improved foreign relations.57 
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a. Economic Reforms 
The Iran-Iraq War was economically very damaging to Iran as Iran’s 
industrial capability was dedicated to the war effort, the method in which both Iran and 
Iraq prosecuted the war was damaging to both economies by targeting each other’s oil 
exports, and a significant portion of Iran’s labor pool was taken out of the productive 
economy to fight.  After the war, much of the Iranian economy was in the hands of statist 
foundations (bonyads), foreign investment was near non-existent, taxes were high, 
defense spending was at record level, and standards of living were poor.  Although 
Khamenei believed that a goal of the Islamic Revolution was self-sufficiency, it was 
readily apparent that a government that cannot provide for its citizen’s needs would not 
survive.58  Steps were taken to liberalize the economy by abolishing rationing, lowering 
defense spending, lowered business taxes, and increased imports.59  The period following 
the Iran-Iraq war saw a continual liberalization of the Iranian economy as peace eased the 
economic exhaustion in Iran, the leaders of Iran had a firm control of the Iranian state and 
were now willing to decentralize the economy to combat social problems like “shrinking 
living standards”.60  President Rafsanjani’s introduction of his first Five-Year Plan 
planned an aggressive expansion of the Iranian economy following the damage to the 
Iranian economy during the Iran-Iraq War caused by the economic strains of the war and 
the fluctuating price of oil, Iran’s main export.61   
While not as successful as the Iranian government had envisioned, through 
structural reform, high oil prices, and economic diversification primarily through 
increased import, the First Five Year Plan proved critical in stabilizing the Iranian 
economy following the Iran-Iraq War that also served to stabilize the domestic political 
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situation.62  Increased oil production and increased industrialization of Iran was to fuel 
Iran’s post-war growth as Iran courted foreign investors.  Agreements with Total and 
CONOCO to develop Iranian oil resources signaled a new era in Iranian foreign 
commercial affairs, just as the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait bolstered world oil prices.63   
A key component of Rafsanjani’s efforts to reform Iran’s economy was to 
decrease military spending.  Unlike Iraq, which had been able to finance the Iran-Iraq 
War through its access to international markets, which had heavily militarized its 
economize under the load of a crushing debt, Iran came out of the war with both a 
ravaged economy and military.  An obvious requirement of Iranian economic reform was 
to reduce defense spending by reducing the size of the military and redirecting 
governmental assets to the civilian sector.64  Fortunately for the Iranian leadership, there 
is a constitutional requirement that “[i]n time of peace, the government must utilize the 
personnel and technical equipment of the Army in relief operations, and for educational 
and productive ends, and the Construction Jihad,” which was interpreted to mean that 
organizations within the government suited to commercial endeavors should be used as 
such.65  Combined with control granted to them by the Iranian government over several 
of the bonyads as reward for faithful service and a new hierarchal ranking system within 
the IRGC, the IRGC expanded from being a purely military organization to beginning to 
operate as its own military-industrial complex—a concept which will be explored later in 
this thesis.66  Under Rafsanjani and Khamenei, Iran’s economy began to open up, the  
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Iranian peoples’ standard of living improved, and either advertently or inadvertently, 
secured continuing positions of power for conservative elements within Iranian society 
through economic dominance.   
A large factor in Rafsanjani and Khamenei’s desired economic reforms 
required improved foreign relations, especially regional affairs and cooperative OPEC 
interaction.  Important of note that existing American sanctions, and subsequent sanctions 
by the United States and international community after 2002, did very little besides 
increasing transactional costs or compelling Iran to accept inferior substitutes, which did 
very little to inconvenience either the government or the populace.67  The American 
sanctions’ lack of effectiveness or even noticeability to the Iranian population is further 
evidence in support of Hypothesis #1, that sanctions failed to have an impact on the rise 
of the reform movement but rather encouraged increased native self-reliance. 
b. Governmental Reform  
Even before the death of Khomeini, governmental reform was underway, 
especially in regard to the office of the president.  Whereas power had previously been 
concentrated in the Supreme Power with few delegated powers to the president and Prime 
Minister, reform centralized power and gave more executive power to the president by 
removing the post of Prime Minister, creating the post of Vice President who was to be 
appointed by the President, and allowing the president to select and dismiss his 
ministers.68  Of course, the Supreme Leader still had ultimate veto power through the 
concept of velayat-e faqih; however, the governmental reforms provide some insight for 
an explanation why Rafsanjani did not directly seek the post of Supreme Leader, with the 
newly established ability to have more of an immediate effect and why Khamenei would 
accept leaving the newly empowered post as President for the opportunity to rise farther 
than Khamenei otherwise ever could, given his position in the religious hierarchy. 
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After Khamenei’s assumption to the office of Supreme Leader and 
Rafsanjani’s as president, both of them realized the necessity to trim the government 
bureaucracy if only to rein in spending.  While the bureaucracy was ultimately 
successful, progress was made in streamlining the ministries by combining several 
therefore reducing them from 25 to 21 ministries.69  However, public sector employment 
remained elevated.70 Even Rafsanjani’s dedication towards reducing the size of the 
military only reduced the active duty military but Iran increased military spending during 
his administration.71 
Despite what both Rafsanjani and Khamenei may have initially intended, 
either the bureaucracy was too entrenched to be reduced or it served the duumvirate’s 
purposes to retain the large governmental structure.  Indeed, government spending even 
increased in the short term in spite of the desire to cut costs, although decreases in 
government spending are evident later in Rafsanjani’s administration.72  Given the 
increased legal authority of the president and the continued legal/religious authority of 
the Supreme Leader, it defies credibility that the bureaucracy would have been able to 
successfully serious efforts by the President or the Supreme Leader to reduce the 
bureaucracy. 
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Figure 1.   Iran’s Arms Deliveries by Supplier 
 
 
Figure 2.   Growth of Iran’s Government Expenditures 
c. Foreign Relations 
A very important aspect to Iranian economic reform was improvements in 
Iran’s foreign relations.  Historical animosity between Iran and the Arab world, regional 
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competition, economic problems caused by the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and 
international isolation during the Iran-Iraq War all crimped Iran’s efforts to rehabilitate 
its economy.  Rafsanjani determined that stability and normalization in the Gulf would 
require positive actions on Iran’s behalf to assure regional powers that Iran did not seek 
to export the Iranian Islamic Revolution as Khomeini had previously dedicated himself.73  
Khamenei approved of Rafsanjani’s efforts to improve regional relations if for no other 
reason than to ensure continued economic recovery, but was severely opposed to 
improved relations with the United States. 
(1)  Regional.  Rafsanjani correctly realized that Saudi Arabia 
was the lever of power within both the Arab world and OPEC, so it behooved Iran to 
make peace, else risk continued antagonism in economic markets such as Saudi Arabia’s 
efforts during the Iran-Iraq was to depress world oil prices to negatively affect Iran.74  
Rafsanjani sought to stabilize relations in the Gulf, proposing Iranian-GCC alliance to 
prevent future events like the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.75  Issues such as Iranian 
participation in the Haj were resolved, and despite the Sunni-Shia divide, relations 
between the two countries continued on a positive trajectory even past the end of 
Rafsanjani’s terms as president.  Relations with other Gulf States similarly improved as 
Saudi-Iranian relations improved. 
Regional stability was key for Iranian stability as Iran confronted 
in the Middle East the hostility of the world’s sole superpower, potential for power 
struggles over oil resources, and regional hostility that Iran was ill-suited to resist in light 
of Iran’s gap between its economic and military capabilities and its previous 
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revolutionary aspirations.76  Rafsanjani’s success in building regional stability more than 
compensated for any negative externalities caused by American sanctions. 
(2)  Europe and Japan.  Given Khamenei’s resistance to 
improved relations with the United States, Rafsanjani sought to make connections with 
other financially developed nations.  Denied access to the United States’ industrial 
markets, Iran invited European countries to export to Iran and participate in Iran’s post-
war rebuilding efforts.  Iran under Rafsanjani aggressively countered American efforts to 
isolate Iran by offering opportunities for European and Japanese investment.77 
Additionally, despite U.S. opposition in February 1994 Germany rescheduled Iran’s debt 
showing the lack of effectiveness of American efforts to diplomatically and economically 
isolate Iran.78  The allure of the economic opportunities available in Iran along with 
Iran’s energy resource export capacity negated any European or Japanese desire to shun 
Iran. 
(3) Russia.  While increased trade with Russia following 
Khomeini’s death is definitely an important aspect of Iran’s foreign affairs, even more 
important was the role that Russia was to play in Iran’s nuclear aspirations.  Khamenei 
and Rafsanjani were both advocates of an Iranian nuclear program, an issue that Supreme 
Leader Khamenei may have seen as a possible counterbalance to Rafsanjani’s desire to 
normalize relations with the United States and Rafsanjani may have seen as a way to free 
the Iranian economy on dependence from importation of refined petroleum products.  
Where Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution could not work with the Soviet Union, the Islamic 
Revolution was not incompatible with newly democratic Russia.  In Russia, Iran found a 
nuclear partner that could be relied upon to resist American demands as even nuclear 
European powers might be able to.79 
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2. Nuclear Program and Sanctions 
Iran’s nuclear program goes back to President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace 
program and continued under Shah Reza Pahlavi’s following his assertion that 
“petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn” and his belief in the eventual 
end of Iran’s oil supply.80  With Iran’s vast oil wealth and the Shah’s close relations with 
the United States and Europe, both American and European companies eagerly sought to 
assist Iran in building nuclear power plants, with both France and Germany playing a 
vital role in beginning to build the Bushehr nuclear plant in 1975.81  The Islamic 
Revolution ended nuclear cooperation and led to a lawsuit in which Iran sued France for 
return of Iranian funds lent to France.  Additionally, the loss of access to foreign sources 
of nuclear materials served as impetus for Iran’s new masters to avoid reliance on foreign 
sources and to develop an indigenous nuclear program.82  Iran’s preoccupation with the 
then ongoing Iran-Iraq War prevented serious dedication of resources to Iran’s nuclear 
program, but the new Iranian leaders never forgot about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 
Following Khomeini’s death and the stabilization of Iran’s economy, Rafsanjani 
and Khamenei sought a partner to help rebuild Iran’s burgeoning nuclear infrastructure.  
Spurned by their former German and French partners, Iran found Russian and Chinese 
help in rebuilding Iran’s nuclear program as no one else would.83  Chinese-supplied 
undeclared nuclear materials from China and the United States’ discomfort with nuclear 
proliferation provoked American antagonism towards Iran’s nuclear program in spite of 
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Khamenei’s fatwa against nuclear weapons.84  Efforts to rebuild nuclear program 
invoked American sanctions as the United States feared what a countries like Iran and 
Iraq with little transparency, vast oil wealth, and past willingness to use chemical 
weapons might do if they developed nuclear weapons. 
Sanctions on Iran tightened in 1992 with the passage of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act of 1992, which effectively extended to Iran sanctions formerly solely 
targeted towards Iraq under the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990.  These new sanctions sought 
to deny Iran and Iraq access to both weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and certain 
types of “advanced conventional weapons,” including “long-range precision-guided 
munitions, fuel air explosives, cruise missiles, low observability aircraft, other radar 
evading aircraft, advanced military aircraft, military satellites, electromagnetic weapons, 
and laser weapons.”85  Sanction methods included prohibition against the United States 
government dealing with any sanctioned entity, prohibition against U.S. export licenses 
to any sanctioned entity, and most importantly, targeting of any country or foreign 
company which is known to “knowingly and materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq” to 
acquire the aforementioned military items.86  By targeting both the Iranian 
government/companies and foreign governments/companies who could potentially be 
involved in any quests to get WMDs or the mentioned conventional weapons, the United 
States widened the scope of sanctions from being merely unilateral to having 
international consequences outside of U.S.-Iran relations. 
In 1995, sanctions against Iran tightened yet again with the issuance of Executive 
Order 12957 and 12959, which specifically prohibited American investment in Iran’s 
energy industry, banned U.S. trade with Iran, and eliminated even third-party Iranian  
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access to American financial markets.87  These sanctions did have significant economic 
effect on Iran, especially proving the vulnerability of Iran’s oil revenue.88  However, 
there was no notable political effect as Iranian markets adjusted with government 
intervention and higher domestic prices for commodities were blamed on the United 
States’ new sanctions.89  However, even with higher domestic prices for consumer goods 
and commodities, even American goods were still available in Iranian markets through 
third party suppliers  establishing a “clear contradiction… between the official rhetoric 
[of both governments] and the reality of American goods flooding the country.”90 
The United States again tried to compel domestic change within Iran with the Iran 
and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), which increasingly sought to target foreign 
companies who did more than $20 million worth of business or invested that amount in 
Iran.91  However, American sanctions that targeted foreign entities were extremely un 
popular internationally, and especially in Europe where the European Union lodged a 
formal complaint against the United States alleging violation of principles of sovereignty 
and violation of rules of the World Trade Organization.92  The United States, eager to 
avoid isolating Europe over Iran declined to enforce the ILSA and “to work together to 
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counter the threat to international security posed by Iran and Libya.”93  Again, the 
American sanctions ultimately failed to have lasting effect because of their unilateral 
nature and lack of international support. 
Iran’s ability, over time, to adjust to sanctions of the 1990s was due to the 
unilateral nature of the sanctions regime.  The sanctions’ lack of political effect supports 
hypothesis #1 in that the sanctions did not affect the rise of the reform movement; 
however, they did further enable continued conservative influence by making 
economically/politically attractive to conservatives increased IRCG and parastatal control 
of certain sectors of the Iranian economy, as well as encouraged Iranian conservatives to 
ensure continued bastions of support for conservative Islamic Revolutionary ideology. 
3. Growing Conservative Footholds in the Iranian Economy and Society 
As Rafsanjani moved to open Iran to the West, especially in economic matters, 
Khamenei and other conservatives sought to temper any liberalizing moves.  Despite the 
expanded powers of the presidency post-Khomeini, the office of Supreme Leader still 
held large legal and moral authority.  Khamenei exercised that authority by appointing 
political commissars across the governmental spectrum and by appointing leaders of the 
IRGC.94  Combined with Khamenei’s moral authority, the Supreme Leader also has 
constitutional authority to appoint “appointing the heads of the judiciary, state radio and 
television, the regular armed forces… [and] control over Iran’s second most powerful 
institution, the Guardian Council”.95  An important bastion of conservative power in Iran 
was Khamenei’s control of the Guardian Council, which has the sole power to accept or 
veto candidates for elections.  Also critical in prolonged conservative influence on Iran 
was Khamenei’s control over the bonyads who after the Islamic Revolution had taken 
control over much of Iran’s industrial base, control through which the Supreme Leader 
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could both reward and break supporters and opponents alike.96  Control over the 
economic, judicial, military, and military-industrial levers of power ensured that any 
reformist or liberalization would have to also affect those bastions of power, therefore 
virtually requiring the consent or at least acquiescence of the Supreme Leader. 
Sanctions following Khomeini’s death and prior to the election of President 
Khatami had the dual effect of both polarizing Iran’s political elite in regard to its view 
towards the United States and served as impetus for continued internalization of Iran’s 
economy.  There was a strong belief amongst conservatives that foreign sanctions are 
actually good for Iran, in that they internalize Iranian demand and support national 
businesses, ignoring opportunity costs inherent in the equation.97  As sanctions threatened 
foreign sources of imports, capital, and export markets, the bonyads and IRGC-run 
enterprises benefited from both a lack of competition and monopolies on state projects, 
the latter trend which was to intensify when conservatives later regained control of 
government.  It is now apparent that as the tide of reform and change began to sweep 
through Iran in the mid-1990s, domestic political change was not due to external factors 
as American backers of sanctions would have hoped but rather a long repressed internal 
desire for change after a long decade of war and economic deprivation.  However, that 
economic deprivation was not caused in large part by economic sanctions, but rather 
those same economic sanctions set the stage for the Iranian economic framework wherein 
conservative bastions of power and influence were strengthened, supporting hypothesis 
#1 that rather than influencing the rise of reform actually strengthened the position of 
conservatives. 
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B. GROWTH OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT 
On May 23, 1997, a relatively Iranian scholar of middling rank named 
Mohammad Khatami was elected President of Iran by 70% of the vote, with an 
unprecedented 80% voter turnout.98  Khatami’s election shocked Iran and the world in 
large part because he beat the charismatic Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri, the establishment 
candidate who had the support of the major bonyads, the Association of Militant Clergy, 
the bazaar, and most perhaps importantly, the IRGC.99  Khatami overcame the obstacles 
by focusing on Iran’s domestic issues, espousing belief in the need to increase the role of 
Iranian civil society, fixing the economy, individual rights, and open international 
dialogue. 
Interesting in the study of Iran’s reform movement is that there was no reform 
movement.  There was no party structure through which liberal politicians could formally 
garner support, few periodicals which supported a reformist agenda, and small chance 
that the Guardian Council would allow openly revisionist politicians to run for office.  
Iran’s reform movement was in fact a reflection of long existing disagreements and 
tensions within the Iranian Islamic Revolution elite who had previously been unified by 
Khomeini’s authority.  These factions were represented by Rafsanjani and his allies from 
the center-right and by Musavi and Khatami from the center-left, and from 1989–1997 
the center-right faction had control of government, especially after the 1992 
parliamentarian elections where center-right candidates won the majority.100   
While a full exploration of factionalism following Khomeini is a doctoral 
dissertation in itself, a basic understanding of factions and their importance in the 1992 
Iranian Majlis and 1993 Iranian presidential elections is crucial towards understanding 
the subsequent rise of the reform movement.  While Khomeini was alive, he would 
balance the factions within the overall revolutionary movement through force of his 
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personality, “skillfully balancing the power of the factions”.101  With Khomeini’s death 
and his replacement by Khamenei who did not possess the same moral or religious 
authority that Khomeini did, factionalism increased.  Rafsanjani’s economic and foreign 
policy reforms following his election as president in 1989 increased the divide between 
the various factions within Iranian politics and his political opponents increased their 
strength in the parliament.102  While the 1992 Majlis election results implied popular 
support for Rafsanjani’s reforms, there were increasing signs of disunity amongst the 
political elite.  The 1993 presidential election was even closer than expected, as 
disaffection on the political right caused them to submit their own candidate to challenge 
Rafsanjani but Rafsanjani won by a comfortable margin.103  However, the splintering and 
polarization of the Iranian polity, especially on the right, was to have an enormous effect 
in the later election of Khatami.  In the lead up to the 1996 elections, Iranian domestic 
politics were in confusion as conservatives were so rattled by a perceived threat of 
Rafsanjani’s political objectives that some encouraged the Revolutionary Guards to 
attack pro-Rafsanjani rallies and violence broke out between elements of the 
Revolutionary Guard and other law enforcement agencies.104   
Allowed to run by the Guardian Council and seen as little chance of winning, 
Khatami upset Iranian politics by winning an overwhelming victory.  The conservative 
candidate, Nategh-Nouri, had support from Khomeini on down from the conservative 
political establishment, the official support of the Revolutionary Guards, the bonyads, 
and the official support of the Association of Militant Clergy.  However, official support 
from all these conservative organizations did not translate out to public support from 
either the members of those organization or the general public, as the Iranian people as a 
whole seemed to clamor for a change from the previous 18 years.105  Lacking a hard-liner 
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candidate, even hard-liners supported him giving Khatami support from the far right, the 
center-left, and the far left with even some support from the right as personified by 
support from the clergy establishment in Qom.106  The reform movement had been 
rumbling in Iranian society for some time, but there had not previously been a candidate 
that could tap into the public disaffection with the status quo.  Khatami was the perfect 
storm of a candidate marginally acceptable to the Guardian Council and the hardliners, 
yet vastly appealing to the electorate, hungry for change, because of his outsider status.  
C. CONCLUSION 
There is a lack of evidence for any assertion that external sanctions affected 
domestic political change within Iran.  Rise of the reformist was due to realignments 
within the political factions of the Iranian Islamic Revolution’s political elite.  Mass 
support came from the people who welcomed Khatami’s message of a more open, 
inclusive Iranian politic.  Conservatives learned their lesson, hunkered down in their 
bastions of power—the judiciary, the Supreme Leader-appointed councils, the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, the bonyads, and the state-controlled industrial sector.  
While the reform movement as personified by Khatami was not in favor of a total 
revision of Iran’s Islamic government, they advocated for a lesser role for the clergy in 
the executive and legislative sections of government and, probably most unsettling for the 
conservative elites, a reengagement with the United States and the West.107  All these 
goals were antithetical to the more conservative members of Iranian politics and they 
would use every tool and lever of power to stymie and obfuscate the reform movement’s 
agenda. 
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IV. DÉTENTE THWARTED?  PROGRESS, ENGAGEMENT,  
AND REJECTION 
A. KHATAMI’S ADMINISTRATION AND POLICIES TOWARDS THE 
WEST 
The election of President Khatami was a shock to both Iran and the rest of the 
world.  The international community, and the United States in particular, was not 
prepared for a potentially revisionist administration in Iran.  As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Khatami was elected by promising increased transparency in governance, 
increased involvement of civil society in Iranian politics, increased emphasis on civil 
rights and renewed international engagement.   
Successful international engagement, especially engagement with the United 
States, was a key to domestic reform but whether it was a critical factor in the reform 
movement’s ultimate failure is debatable given the fundamental obstacle to reforms: the 
very structure of Iran’s government.  The Shia concept of velayat-e faqih from which the 
clerical leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran claim their authority and the powers given 
to the Supreme Leader by the Constitution of Iran make unilateral policy changes by any 
branch of the Iranian government, other than the Supreme Leader, nearly impossible.  
However, since to question the role of the clergy in Iran’s governmental system was to 
challenge the legitimacy of the state and the Islamic characteristic of the Republic, the 
only option to effect change was to attempt to institute the desired change within the 
governmental construct.108  The question that one must address is whether reformist 
agenda was impeded by an externality like sanctions or whether the main impediment to 
the reform movement was Iran’s governmental structure. 
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1. Impediment to Change: Iran’s Governmental Structure 
President Khatami, from his own statements and campaign platforms, clearly 
realized that Iran could only fully join the modern world by engagement with the West 
and by having a government fully accountable to its constituency.109  Khatami’s most 
difficult objective was attempting to enact reform in a system where his office did not 
have the needed power or influence.  Careful not to anger conservatives or be seen as a 
radical reformist, Khatami has “vowed to work within the system” by reaffirming his 
personal belief in velayat-e faqih as the basis of Iran’s political system which served as 
reassurance to Khamenei and his followers who must have been concerned over the 
election of the opponent of the establishment candidate, Nateq Nuri, and the implications 
towards clerical control.110  Shortly after the election of Khatami, Khamenei clearly 
cautioned the new government to remain true to the Iranian Islamic Republic’s 
revolutionary values and to avoid sudden changes, perhaps as a subtle reminder of the 
Supreme Leader’s constitutional authority.111  Even though Khatami won the presidential 
election, there was still the issue of who had power and what the exercise of power would 
mean for both the conservatives and the reformists.  
a. Conservative Bastions of Power 
As previously mentioned in Chapter III, Iranian conservatives retained 
influence in Iran through their domination of both official and parastatal organizations 
within the Iranian power structure.  The most important bastions of conservative 
influence, which enabled their continued relevance even during the apex of the reformist 
surge, proved to be the Iranian Parliament, the leadership of the armed services including 
the IRCG, the judiciary, the bonyads, and the office of the Supreme Leader.  Not only did  
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Khatami have to contend with internal opposition to his overall agenda, he also had to 
contend with international opposition that both strengthened his opponents and 
discouraged his supporters. 
In the days following the election of President Khatami, it became 
increasingly apparent that Khatami’s promised reforms would be difficult to obtain as the 
Iranian Parliament, the Majlis, reelected Khatami’s presidential election opponent, Nuri, 
as its speaker.112  While the 1996 Majlis election results seemed to indicate an upsurge in 
support for the reformist agenda, the use of the judiciary by conservatives, as illustrated 
in the detention of Tehran’s Mayor Karbaschi in 1998, to strike at the reform agenda and 
its supporters indicated that conservative opposition to reform was still solid.  After the 
Islamic Revolution, Islamic scholars quickly replaced the “secular university educated 
judges” that had dominated the Iranian judiciary prior to the revolution, and when 
coupled with the constitutional authority of the Supreme Leader to indirectly appoint the 
judiciary, it is little wonder that the judiciary was and remains a redoubt of conservative 
thought.113  Towards the end of Khatami’s first term, the judiciary further showed its 
anti-reformist inclination by ruling against publications critical of the IRGC’s role in 
Iranian politics.114 Despite the increased parliamentarian support, the Supreme Leader’s 
constitutional power and control of the Guardian Council ensured that any attempts to 
change the Iranian system of government can be controlled by both the veto power held 
by the Supreme Leader and by the vetting authority vested in the Guardian Council for 
any potential office seekers. 
The role of the Guardian Council, in particular, has been critical for the 
conservative check on reformist advances as it is both insulated from popular pressure by 
virtue of being appointed by the Supreme Leader and at the same time provides a layer of 
separation between the dirty work of domestic politics and the Supreme Leader.  The 
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Supreme Leader, through the Guardian Council, is able to steer the overall direction 
Iranian elections by indicating which political philosophies are acceptable and which are 
not with the Guardian Council then disqualifying candidates as needed.115  As President 
Khatami sought parliamentarian support for engagement with the West, the other 
governmental institutions were busy limiting avenues of support for reformists, thus 
creating the public perception that Khatami’s foreign relations strategy was not working.  
Without success abroad, the reformist agenda at home begins to fray towards the end of 
Khatami’s first presidential term as other conservative centers of power such as the 
military embark on expansion, development, and acquisitions programs which in turn 
invite additional international scrutiny.  The West, unwilling to make concessions 
without initial Iranian concessions, unwittingly hampers the West’s best hope for 
governmental change in Iran.  However, as inconvenient as international sanctions and 
international marginalization is for Khatami’s reform movement, just as those sanctions 
and international isolation cannot solely be credited for Iran’s economic troubles, they 
also cannot be credited with the ultimate failure of Khatami’s reform movement.  The 
very structure of Iran’s government is designed to maintain ultimate power in the hands 
of the most conservative of all institutions, that of the Supreme Leader and his 
appointees.116 
2. International Reactions to Iranian Overtures 
The United States executive branch saw in Khatami’s administration an opening 
to engage Iran as “an opportunity to break with the rigidity of the past and put relations 
on a new, non-hostile footing”; however, there was no overwhelming demand in 
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American politics to meaningfully adjust U.S.-Iranian relations.117  Iran, under 
Rafsanjani, had previously attempted to engage with the United States economically 
Conversely, for all the Iranian rhetoric for increased engagement, Khatami continued to 
denounce Zionism, assist Hezbollah, increase domestic military production.118   
In 1999, at the UN General Assembly, Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi replied 
when queried on Iran’s possible response to unilateral easing of the United States’ 
sanctions on Iranian food and carpet exports that Iran would “respond positively.”  Six 
months later in March 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright announced an 
easing of sanctions that was not reciprocated with any positive Iranian concessions, 
apparently due to Khamenei’s opposition to détente with the West.119  This undermining 
of Khatami’s overtures towards the West in turn discouraged the United States and other 
observers on Iran’s willingness to bargain in good faith.  The rejection of the American 
easing of sanctions by Iran’s conservatives utilization of their remaining levers of power 
supports this thesis’ second and third hypothesis’ that Iran’s conservatives both sought to 
undermine the reform movement’s attempts to engage the West while simultaneously 
undermining the reform movement’s appeal in domestic politics by the reformist 
administration’s lack of success in easing sanctions.  As Sharam Chubin put it: 
For the conservatives, the issue [was] how to use foreign policy to 
strengthen the regime, without giving the reformists and chance to take 
credit for its successes.  For the reformists, the problem [was] how to use 
foreign policy to meet Iran’s growing needs—including improving its 
international standing and increasing it influence and voice—and how to 
use the legitimacy gained thereby to push for further changes 
domestically.120 
Khatami found some success in the continuation of Rafsanjani’s efforts towards 
improving relations in the Middle East and the European Union, and even attempted to 
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continue Rafsanjani’s spurned overtures towards the United States.121  A notable 
exception is under Khatami, Iran ceased overt subversion of neighboring nations in the 
Persian Gulf.  However, the efforts at détente in the Persian Gulf did not extend to 
disarmament, territorial disputes, or cessation of military growth.122  Khamenei supported 
Khatami’s efforts in the Persian Gulf, but the question of Iranian conservatives’ sincerity, 
must be questioned in light of the continued military buildup, which supports this thesis’ 
second hypothesis that conservative elements in Iran’s government during the reformist 
administration intentionally sought to undermine Khatami’s efforts at international 
engagement and, indeed, invoked international distrust and additional sanctions. 
Because there was no positive reply to American gestures such as the lifting of 
sanctions on Iranian textiles and foodstuffs, there was no incentive for the United States 
to make further gestures in terms of easing of sanctions.  However, there is no empirical 
evidence that continued American sanctions served any purpose other than to continually 
undermine the Iranian reform movement’s agenda and furthering the cause of Iran’s 
conservatives seeking to regain the support of the Iranian electorate.  Conversely, the 
Iranian reform movement’s appeal continued in the aftermath of continued American 
sanctions indicating that the effect of American sanctions in the late 1990s and early 
2000s did not significantly factor in the Iranian electorate’s decision on what course Iran 
was to take politically.  However, it is undeniable that Iranian conservatives view Iran’s 
foreign policy as inextricably linked with Iran’s domestic policy and that any threat to the 
status quo in international affairs might further upset the domestic political balance in 
favor of the reformist.123   
Ultimately, there was a scholarly consensus view that Khatami’s overtures to the 
West and regionally in the Middle East should have been encouraged more aggressively, 
but carefully, lest Khatami and his allies be painted as “foreign agents.”124  As much as 
                                                 
121Ibid.,28–30. 
Ansari, Confronting Iran, 143–145. 




both the United States administration and reformers within Iran might have wished that 
foreign policy could be affected without domestic concerns, the fact remains that 
domestic affairs weigh heavily in charting foreign policy.  Eager to limit the reformist 
administration’s international overtures, conservatives focused on ensuring maximum use 
of domestic policy that they could control through their bastions of power, mainly in the 
national security realm. 
B. IRAN’S MILITARY AMBITION AND ITS EFFECT ON IRAN’S 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 
As discussed in Chapters II and III, the military in Iran had by the end of the Iran-
Iraq War become one of the major centers of conservative power.  The constitutional 
reforms following the death of Khomeini only reinforced the armed services as a haven 
for conservatives.  The military and Revolutionary Guard continued as a base of power 
for conservatives well into Khatami’s administration, retaining influence by virtue of 
patronage from the Supreme Leader, revolutionary legitimacy as guardians of the Islamic 
Revolution, and a growing economic empire.  There is no definite literature regarding 
whether conservatives during the period of Khatami’s administration intentionally used 
Iran’s military ambitions to derail Khatami’s and the reform movement’s international 
engagement goals, but it is undeniable that the actions of Iran’s defense apparatuses had a 
direct effect on foreign powers and their relations with Khatami’s administration.  During 
Khatami’s administration, direct correlations are seen between Iranian military ventures, 
deteriorating international views on Iran as a responsible partner, and the imposition of 
sanctions that in turn strengthened domestic detractors of the reform movement. 
1. The Supreme Leader’s Authority 
As previously mentioned in this chapter, the role of the Supreme Leader is central 
to the political administration of Iran.  To fully understand the ability of conservatives to 
withstand the reformist movement and even thrive, one must also understand the 
authority given to the Supreme Leader, both informally (through revolutionary 
legitimacy) and formally (through the Iranian Constitution), and how this authority was 
used by Khamenei and conservatives to prevent and minimize the effect of the reformist 
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agenda.  This section will directly address the relationship between Iranian conservatives, 
the Supreme Leader, the Iranian Armed Forces/national security apparatus and  their 
effect on the reformist agenda. 
The domestic balance of power that Khamenei faced upon assumption of the 
office of Supreme Leader was significantly different from the situation Khomeini 
enjoyed.  Where Khomeini enjoyed both religious legitimacy via his religious scholarly 
credentials and revolutionary legitimacy through his steadfast opposition to the Shah’s 
regime, Khamenei derived his legitimacy from the implied approval of Khomeini and 
election by the Assembly of Experts.  As Khamenei was not an ayatollah prior to his 
elevation to Supreme Leader, he lacks the religious legitimacy that the concept of 
velayat-e faqih upon the basic governmental structure of Iran requires, making his 
acceptability and prestige to the Iranian public significantly lower than what Khomeini 
enjoyed.125  This lack of true legitimacy initially forced Khamenei into the camp of 
religious conservatives who supported the velayat-e faqih and could lend their “religious 
qualifications to augment” Khamenei’s grip on power.126  However, even in relying on 
the conservative religious scholars for support, Khamenei must be careful as according to 
Buchta, 19 of 20 Grand Ayatollahs are believed to not support the concept of velayat-e 
faqih, with many Grand Ayatollahs both denying Khamenei’s claim to the rank of Grand 
Ayatollah and even some questioning the legitimacy of the Supreme Leader.127  With his 
scholarly legitimacy not as secure as Khomeini’s, Khamenei has also had to rely on his 
other source of legitimacy to secure his absolute right to rule: the Constitution and the 
authority over the various government apparatus’, especially the armed forces. 
The Constitution names the Supreme Leader as commander in chief of the Armed 
Forces, gives the Supreme Leader the legal authority to both appoint and dismiss 
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commanders of the regular armed forces and the Revolutionary Guard Corps.128  As 
Supreme Leader, Khamenei has consistently appointed leaders of the regular armed 
forces and the revolutionary security forces, and would therefore exert enormous 
influence over their behavior and agenda.  During the Khatami administration, the 
President had to contend with what the IRCG and the other parts of Iran’s national 
security forces might do, as the President does not have direct control of the military or 
the IRCG.  The role of the IRCG became especially important in domestic and foreign 
politics as the Basij under IRGC control were used to break up student demonstrations in 
the late 1990s and the IRGC’s Quds Force actively and continually sought to export the 
Islamic Revolution and supported organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah.129 Even the 
regular military forces continued and enhanced a “highly active schedule” of military 
exercises which unsettled its Persian Gulf neighbors, while increasing investment in 
suspected WMD programs and increasing Iran’s indigenous military-industrial complex’s 
capacity.130 It is highly unlikely that the IRGC or the regular armed forces would have 
taken such provocative postures if Khatami and his reform agenda enjoyed the full 
support of Khamenei and his appointees, indicating subtle indications of the 
conservatives’ disapproval and covert methods of derailing the reformist agenda.  The 
Supreme Leader’s military influence relied on three pillars: the regular and revolutionary 
armed forces, pursuit of a nuclear program, and the indigenous military-industrial 
complex and parastatal foundations which will be addressed in Chapter 5. 
a. Guardians of the Revolution 
From the immediate days following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, 
irregular militias held great authority as supporters of Khomeini and the Revolution.  
Once the regular military was suborned to the new revolutionary state and took on the 
Islamic revolutionary identity, it too was seen as a defender of the Revolution.  The 
                                                 
128Buchta, Who Rules Iran? 46. 
129Alfoneh, “The Revolutionary Guards’ Role in Iranian Politics,” accessed April 30, 2012. 
Michael Eisenstadt, “The Military Dimension,” in Iran Under Khatami: A Political, Economic and 
Military Assessment by Patrick Clawson et al. (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), 72–74. 
130Michael Eisenstadt, “The Military Dimension,” in Iran Under Khatami: A Political, Economic and 
Military Assessment by Patrick Clawson et al. (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), 74–76. 
 54
IRGC was an early ally of conservatives within Iran, allying itself with the “Islamic 
Republican Party… all close aides and disciples of Ayatollah Khomeini,” much to the 
chagrin of President Ban-Sadr.131   
The efforts of both the regular armed forces and the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps during Iran-Iraq War greatly added to the mystique of the armed forces as 
defenders of both Iran and the Revolution.132  The respect with which the IRGC and 
associated Basij militias are viewed for their service and martyrdom during the Iran-Iraq 
War led to the institutionalization of the revolutionary security services, and has led to 
their permutation into all levels of Iranian society.133  In return for the Supreme Leader’s 
economic and governmental support, the IRGC and associated Basij militias have acted 
as the fist and shield of the Iranian regime both externally and internally.  Since the Iran-
Iraq War, the IRCG has increased both its organizational levels and capabilities, 
becoming a more regular military entity yet retaining its revolutionary flavor by its 
“export-of-the-revolution activities… and its involvement in ensuring popular 
compliance of Islamic law.”134 
Due to the religiousness associated with members of the revolutionary 
security services, it is inconceivable, at present, that they would refuse to protect the 
conservative interests represented by the clerical establishment of Iran as represented by 
the Supreme Leader or that the revolutionary security services would not act if there was 
a perception that the Islamic Revolution was being threatened internally.  The influence 
which the IRCG and other revolutionary security services have in Iran and potential 
influence on Iran’s foreign affairs is evidence in support of this thesis’ second hypothesis 
that conservative-leaning organizations within Iran might pursue behavior that might 
thwart attempts by the reformist administration at normalization.  However, ideological 
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interests are not the only interests critical to the IRGC as political, economic, and social 
interests as represented by their influence in the economy of Iran. 
b. Iran’s Nuclear Program 
The final pillar of the Supreme Leader’s military influence, and therefore 
potential indirect influence over foreign affairs, is the development of Iran’s nuclear 
program.  While Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Khamenei were in favor of Iran developing an 
indigenous nuclear program, doubtlessly Khatami saw Iran’s nuclear program as a 
possible obstacle to his international engagement goals.  A strong nationalist, Khatami 
supported Iran’s nuclear program, appointing a competent administrator to head the 
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.135  What is less clear is whether Khatami supported 
the potential weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program, given his campaign platform of 
transparency/rule of law and Iran’s adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Karim Sadjadpour states that Khamenei may have seen international 
opposition to Iran’s nuclear program as attempts to repress Iranian self-sufficiency.136  A 
member of the Iranian parliament stated that “the Supreme Leader ‘is the main arbitrator 
of the different levels of nuclear policy,” indicating that Khatami’s preferences for the 
direction of Iran’s nuclear program may not have mattered, even if Iran’s nuclear policy 
damaged his foreign policy goals.137  Indeed, damaging Khatami’s foreign policy goals 
may have been Khamenei’s goal.  Certainly, comments made by the head of the IRGC in 
1998 regarding Iran’s nuclear and chemical weapon aspirations were troubling to the 
international community, especially the influence that the head of the IRGC could have 
on Iran’s stance concerning WMD programs.138  What is clear is that Iran’s continued 
pursuit of a nuclear program drew continued international opposition from the West, 
especially the United States, which continually campaigned to limit Iranian access to 
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international nuclear markets.139  As will be discussed in the next chapter, Iran’s 
unwillingness to make fully transparent its nuclear program led to the severe deterioration 
of relations between the United States and Iran in the post-9/11 world, in spite of 
previously progressing relations. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to shed light on the difficulties faced by Iranian reformists in 
implementing their agenda, particularly knowledge on whether international sanctions 
impeded the reform movement.  As Chapter III established that the Iranian reform 
movement was mainly a product of internal Iranian divisions and owed very little to the 
effect of sanctions, such is the case in regard to the effect of sanctions on the reform 
movement’s difficulties.  The main impediment to change was Iran’s constitutionally 
mandated governmental structure wherein the Supreme Leader held the preponderance of 
power and political influence.  Supporting this thesis’ first hypothesis is the linkage 
between the effects of sanctions and the faltering of the Iranian reform movement in the 
indirect, and unintentional, economic and political boost that conservative centers of 
power like the IRGC and parastatal foundations received because of the effect sanctions 
had on preventing fair and open economic interaction between Iran and the rest of the 
world.  Thus strengthened, the aforementioned centers of conservative power used their 
legal and tangential influence to continually stymie and obfuscate the reform agenda, by 
continually pushing Iran’s government into internationally incomprehensible behavior, 
such as Iran’s security services’ ever-continuing push for increased militarization and 
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The reform movement, which began with so much promise of open governance 
and rule of law, was ultimately doomed by the rule of law, the governmental structure 
created by the Constitution.  The governmental structure of Iran ensured that any change 
that was not fully supported by the Supreme Leader would ultimately fail.  While not 
fatal to the reform movement, international isolation created by sanctions only enhanced 
the position of conservative bastions of power while denying some of the potential 
legitimacy Khatami’s administration might have garnered domestically had its 
international engagement goals been more successful. 
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V. CONSERVATIVE RESURGENCE IN IRAN 
A. BEGINNING OF THE END FOR THE IRANIAN REFORM MOVEMENT 
In a way, to say that conservative influence in Iran increased in the post-9/11 
world is incorrect.  A more correct assessment would be that reformist influence waned 
due to steady pressure from conservatives, world events, and changing priorities for the 
Iranian electorate.  Still, the period immediately preceding Khatami’s 2001 reelection and 
his second administration merit close study in seeking to answer this thesis’ question 
regarding the effects of sanctions on Iranian domestic politics, particularly the growth 
and decline of the reform movement and the reemergence of the conservative movement.  
Evidence in previous chapters shows minimal effect on the formation and growth of the 
reform movement, while revealing how sanctions had second-order effects in making 
possible, and reinforcing, conservative centers of power (especially the revolutionary 
security services and their economic empire).  This chapter will seek to further explore 
any effects of sanctions on the continued demise of the reform movement and the upsurge 
of the conservative movement following the 2001 reelection of Khatami. 
1. Increasing Influence: Centers of Conservative Power 
Khatami entered his first administration with the strong support of the majority of 
the Iranian electorate and with Iranian conservatives either fragmented or unsure of how 
to confront the winds of reform.  As the first executive not directly connected to 
Khomeini’s patronage, Khatami charted not only the Iranian presidency’s relationship 
with the other institutions of Iran’s government but also attempted to implement the 
reforms which he promised.  Khatami was effectively attempting to chart the course in 
which Iran would go, having previously been rudderless following almost two years of 
revolution, eight years of war, and seven years of consolidation.  Unfortunately, Khatami 
quickly learned that the powers allowed to the Iranian president, and even the Iranian 
parliament, were insufficient to make the changes the reformist wished. 
Khatami’s second administration saw increased political and economic activity by 
the reform movement’s conservative opponents.  While not the only conservative 
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strongholds, the increased involvement in politics of the IRGC and the judiciary was 
especially telling for the Iranian reform movement’s longevity.  Focus on the IRGC and 
judiciary’s activities also allows us to see the effect of sanctions on conservatives as the 
IRGC’s political influence can be at least partially attributed to their increased economic 
power and, therefore, the effects of sanctions whereas the judiciary’s influence is wholly 
outside any direct connection to the effect of sanctions. 
2. Increasing Economic Power of the IRGC 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the economic and political power of the IRGC 
and parastatal foundations continually and steadily increased.  State-controlled industry 
had been increasing since the revolution, and increased pace in the early 2000s.140  Of 
particular interest in the study of the IRGC’s economic power is the relationship between 
the IRGC, the Iranian government, and military-dominated industries.  This relationship 
is indicative of the economic, and subsequent political, power that the IRGC was gaining 
even during the reformist administrations of Khatami. 
a. Iran’s Military-Industrial Complex and Parastatal Foundations 
As discussed in Chapter II, the military and state domination of Iran’s 
economy began almost immediately following the Islamic Revolution with the 
revolutionaries’ takeover of state-owned industries and parastatal foundations.  Shut off 
from their former American sources of weapons and actively precluded from 
participation in the international weapons market, Iran increasingly sought to decrease its 
reliance on foreign sources of weaponry by developing an indigenous military production 
industry.  In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, as the Supreme Leader and even 
Rafsanjani sought to stabilize the Iranian system of government, it was easier to reward 
the IRGC for its loyalty and to create stability at a time where both Khamenei and 
Rafsanjani were looking into downsizing the scope of Iranian government, so the 
argument is made that Rafsanjani effectively “bought off” the IRGC by giving them 
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increasing control of the military-industrial complex.141  Aided by growing informal 
social networks, the IRGC and its associated businesses were awarded no-bid contracts 
that further increased the IRGC’s economic influence in Iran.142  Of important note, it 
was sanctions and barriers-to-entry created by sanctions that created the enabling 
economic conditions under which IRGC-controlled businesses prospered as foreign firms 
were either unable or unwilling to engage in Iranian development and other native Iranian 
firms were unable to compete economically with the scale of industry the IRGC and its 
affiliates could afford due to governmental support. 
Additionally, the government also increased the role of IRGC in the 
bonyads, with a former minister of the Revolutionary Guards serving as director of the 
Bonyad-e Janbazan Va Mostaz’afan, a politically and economically influential 
foundation.143  Indirectly controlling several powerful bonyads, the IRCG had a source of 
political power as they could use the wealth generated by the bonyads to gain political 
patronage and further immerse itself in the economic and political fabric of Iran.144 The 
economic power of the bonyads has even been used to develop Iranian business outside 
of Iran, possibly in violation of sanctions.  It is not insignificant that the Supreme Leader 
appoints the leaders of many of Iran’s largest bonyads and filled vacancies with veterans 
of the IRGC, and that the profits from the bonyads are used exclusively for the benefit of 
conservative interests, with even some speculation of possible ties to Iran’s nuclear 
program due to proximity of bonyad offices to suspected Iranian nuclear sites.145  Using 
the economic resources of the bonyads, conservatives worked during the Khatami 
administration to negate and diminish popular support 
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While the focus of this thesis is not the IRGC’s economic roles within 
Iran, the issue of the IRGC’s economic influence and how this economic strength has 
translated to political strength for Khamenei and conservatives is critical in understanding 
the role of the IRGC as a pillar of political influence for conservatives.  We see that there 
is a linkage between the IRGC, the parastatal foundations, and the Supreme Leader 
creating a level of influence that was, at best, disapproving of the reformist agenda and, at 
worst, openly acting to counter the reformist agenda.  Reformists could not counter the 
conservative influence, as they neither had control of the revolutionary security services 
nor the ability to appoint the leaders of those services or affiliates.  Nor could reformist 
diminish the role of conservatives in industry and the parastatal foundations without 
risking popular backlash because of the role of the foundations in everyday Iranian life 
and the economic activity generated by industry. 
b. Defense Industries Organization 
In the period following the Iranian Revolution, the revolutionary 
government under Khomeini allocated parastatal industries to different revolutionary 
authorities.  In the period preceding the Iran-Iraq War and during the war inclusive, the 
DIO “filled the gap” between Iran’s military material needs and what Iran could actually 
import.146  As the war progressed, the DIO increasingly took on the task of 
manufacturing increasingly sophisticated military wares with dual use capabilities.  This 
capacity allowed DIO companies like Iran Electronic Industries and Integrated Electronic 
Industries to convert to consumer goods after the Iran-Iraq War.147  In 2002, during 
Khatami’s second administration, with the Iranian economy continuing its liberalization, 
a Turkish cellphone company attempted entry into the Iranian market.  This threat to the 
IRGC’s telecommunication industry was met by opposition from the Council of 
Guardians and the Bonyad-e Janbazan Va Mostaz’afan, an IRGC-controlled parastatal 
foundation.148  While not a direct result of the effects of sanctions, this legal and 
                                                 




bureaucratic obstruction of free enterprise is indicative of the level of economic and 
political influence the IRGC had been able to accrue even during the reformist 
administrations. 
Without serious international competition, in part due to international 
sanctions, IRGC-run industries were able to capitalize and achieve market dominance 
that provided the IRGC with the funds needed to “support not only IRGC operations but 
also augment the personal wealth of the IRGC leadership.”149  These funds were also 
used to influence the Iranian electorate as will be described in a following section entitled 
“Low Politics: Bribing the Populace.” 
c. State-Sponsored: Growth of the Ghorb 
Similarly and perhaps more importantly than the IRGC-run DIO was an 
organization known as gharargah sazandegi khatam alanbia (Ghorb), which also had an 
enormous effect on the IRGC’s domestic influence.150 Established in the aftermath of the 
Iran-Iraq War, the Ghorb sought to capitalize on the IRGC’s institutional engineering 
capabilities and to become a profitable proposition for the IRGC and the government that, 
under Rafsanjani and Khamenei, was seeking to reduce government liabilities.  Thanks to 
the strong support of the Iranian government, Ghorb has become “one of Iran’s largest 
contractors in industrial and development projects,” largely through no-bid contracts or, 
in the case of oil field development, in large part due to the stifling effects sanctions had 
on foreign company participation in the Iranian economy.151  This IRGC domination of 
the construction industry is analogous to the growth of Iran’s indigenous military-
industrial complex and is evidence in support of this thesis’ first hypothesis that sanctions 
created the economic framework wherein conservative forces gained economic power. 
Still, the question posed here is how economic dominance by the IRGC 
and its subsidiary translates out to political power.  After all, in the system of government 
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more common in the West, even economic powerhouses cannot exercise political power 
sufficient to seriously affect the electorate due to institutions.  However, such is not the 
case in Iran, especially in the case of the sway the IRGC and other conservative 
organizations could have over the populace due in large part to the tacit approval of the 
some institutions in the state like the judiciary and the office of the Supreme Leader.  
With similar values and ultimate goals to that of other state institutions, the IRGC and its 
affiliate industries were able to present themselves as champions of both the Islamic 
Revolution and the Iranian populace through their works. 
d. Low Politics:  Influencing the Populace 
Drawing upon scholarly literature, this chapter has established 
conclusively the participation of the IRGC in the Iranian economy and how that 
economic activity was made possible in large part due to the effects of sanctions.  Thus 
far, less clear has been the connection between the IRGC, its economic activities, and 
effect on the electorate that brought about the end of the reform movement.  The IRGC’s 
economic power has manifested itself politically through the public reputation the IRGC 
cultivates through its public-works projects, growth of the Basij militias, and the 
bonyads. 
One of the easiest ways to influence a population is to make a positive 
impression by delivering what they need.  As illustrated by the United States’ own 
Tammany Hall-style politics of the late 19th century, client-patron politics where the 
patron delivers on improvements is a powerful tool.  The IRGC, through its industrial 
affiliates, ably created good will towards the IRGC and the conservative agenda by 
building roads, buildings, pipelines and other infrastructure projects in Iran, especially the 
rural areas.152  Additionally, the construction projects were used as an opportunity to 
expand the ranks of the Basij militias who did much of the work in the rural areas and 
were seen as a positive rather than a negative, as they were increasingly seen in urban 
areas.  By building rural infrastructure, while bolstering the ranks of IRGC-affiliated 
militias, conservatives began to enjoy popular support rurally to counterbalance the urban 
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support for the reformists.  As the reform movement appeared to present a greater threat 
to Khamenei and the concept of theocracy in Iran, the IRGC and the Basij militias 
became an increasingly important and effective tool for spreading the conservative 
message.153  As the Iranian electorate as a whole grew increasingly dissatisfied and 
disenchanted with the results delivered by the reform movement, they would remember 
the public works provided by the IRGC and be thus influenced. 
B. CHANGES IN IRAN’S DOMESTIC POLITICS 
As described in this and the previous chapter, there was a marked increase of the 
IRCG’s participation in Iranian domestic politics.  Using political influence they began to 
accrue by heading industry and the bonyads, several influential leaders of the IRGC 
began involving themselves in politics, giving the impression that “the IRGC [was] 
emerg[ing] as a sort of praetorian guard for conservatives seeking to displace Khatami 
supporters from political power.”154  However, the IRGC was not alone as a conservative 
center of power working to counter the reform movement, with other conservative-
dominated institutions of the Iranian Republic also working to forestall the reformist 
agenda. 
In 2001, Mostafa Tajzadeh, Iran’s deputy interior minister and a Khatami 
confidant, was sentenced to a year in prison by the conservative judiciary for supposed 
voter fraud in the 2000 parliamentary elections.  Outsiders saw this as the judiciary 
flexing its political muscle and communicating to Khatami that conservatives would not 
easily accede to the reformist agenda and also seen as an attempt by conservatives to 
prevent Tajzadeh’s playing a significant role in the 2001 presidential election.155  The 
results of the 2003 municipal elections saw a vast increase in representation of 
conservative politicians at the local levels, setting the tone for the 2004 Majlis and 2005 
presidential elections.156  The support of the conservative judiciary, along with the 
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residual opposition from the IRGC and consistent interference by the Council of Experts, 
was crucial in obstructing the reform movement.  This obstruction and the seeming 
failure of the reform movement to deliver on its promises left the Iranian electorate 
beginning to feel disenchanted. 
By 1998, the beginning signs of disaffection with Khatami began to emerge 
amongst his supporters as dissatisfaction with domestic change, which drove some of 
those reformist to demonstrations in support of Ayatollah Montazeri, which in turn 
“angered... hardline conservatives” who were dissatisfied with Khatami’s 
administration’s efforts to maintain order.  This disaffection within the reform movement 
and the subsequent conservative backlash against reformist politicians signaled the 
lasting strength of conservatives within the state governmental apparatus and the political 
fragmentation of the reform movement that conservatives would later exploit.157  As the 
reform movement was increasingly stymied by conservatives within Iran’s governmental 
structure, popular opinion began to ferment against the reform movement but there was 
still not a divisive domestic issue upon which conservatives could capitalize.  However, 
there soon reappeared an issue: Iran’s nuclear program. 
1. Iran’s Nuclear Issue 
Iran’s nuclear program was an issue that greatly affected Iran’s domestic politics 
as it both invited external sanctions and, as outlined in Chapter IV, presented Khatami 
with a thorny foreign policy issue.  While firmly in Khatami suspended nuclear 
enrichment program during negotiations with the IAEA, but his willingness to suspend 
Iran’s enrichment programs during negotiations was dangerous politically as it allowed 
conservatives to question Khatami’s domestic politics and dedication to Iran’s nuclear 
program.  This placed Khatami in an awkward international position wherein he had to 
both seek normalization of relations and negotiations regarding Iran’s nuclear program, 
while trying to reduce the burden of sanctions without being portrayed as an appeaser to 
the domestic electorate.158  What hurt Khatami and the reform movement in general is 
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that there were no concrete concessions by the United States and the international 
community for the Iranian suspension of enrichment programs, leading the Iranian 
electorate to further conclude that the path of the reform movement was not working, 
especially in keeping Iran strong internationally.  This development in Iranian politics 
partially supports this thesis’ third hypothesis that western sanctions negatively affected 
the reform movement’s attempts to bring Iran in line with international norms and 
increased the Iranian electorate’s support for the conservatives that would manifest itself 
in the 2005 presidential election, especially with the affect that President Bush’s 2002 
State of the Union Address had on polarizing Iran’s foreign policy. 
2. Khamenei’s Influence on Iran’s Domestic Politics 
Khamenei leans towards retaining Iran’s revolutionary character, advocating that 
Iran cultivate “loneliness” and avoid the contamination that accompanies globalization, 
especially as the United States dominates the global market.  Any emulation of the West 
or the United States in particular is suborning the Islamic Revolution, and thereby Islam, 
to the West.159  Khamenei views the United States as an “existential threat,” and is 
therefore weary of any attempts to normalize relationships with the United States.160  
This disapproval towards policies of engagement and normalization would naturally 
prejudice Khamenei against the reform movement’s foreign policy goals, which would in 
turn cement Khamenei’s support for conservatives in Iran’s domestic politics.  Continued 
U.S. sanctions and their effects only further served to prejudice Khamenei against 
rapprochement with the United States and the West. 
C. THE FAILURE OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT’S FOREIGN POLICY 
AMBITIONS 
Iran’s 2003 decision to restart enrichment activities led the EU to end its 
“constructive engagement” policy and impose sanctions, which was a victory for the 
United States in its goal to diplomatically isolate Iran.161  This diplomatic isolation 
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benefited Iranian conservatives, but the sanctions only had minimal effects on Iran’s 
economy and did not affect or alter Iran’s behavior.  As there was no threat of additional 
consequences beyond sanctions, the EU and American sanctions in the early 2000s only 
served to reinforce the conservative position that negotiations with the West were futile.  
Without a doubt, the beginning of the end for rapprochement between Iran and the West 
came with President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address in which he included Iran 
as part of the “axis of evil.” 
1. Axis of Evil 
In the aftermath of 9/11, there was actually a significant reconsideration by both 
the United States and Iran on possible realignments in their mutual goals in the Middle 
East, with significant cooperation appearing possible on the subject of Afghanistan.162  
However, President Bush’s inclusion of Iran in the “axis of evil” in 2002 convinced 
Iranian conservative political elite that Washington’s goal was to change and/or seriously 
undermine the structure of the Islamic Republic.163  The United States’ subsequent 
actions against Iraq further confirmed, to Iran, this suspicion of the Bush’s administration 
desire for regime change in Iran.  As a result, “Iran [was] not tempted by the various 
carrots offered by European negotiators, with tepid backing from Washington, to induce 
Iran to cease enrichment.”164  With little incentive to alter its nuclear program’s progress, 
Iran continually isolated itself by acting outside international norms concerning its 
nuclear program. 
The inclusion of Iran in company with a failed state like North Korea and a 
dictatorship like Iraq, there was no more room for negotiations by the reformist 
administration.  There was no reward domestically for Khatami to continue seeking a 
normalized relationship with the West and the public insult to Iran served as confirmation 
to conservatives and the Iranian electorate that the United States was not to be trusted and 
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only sought to deny Iran its full rights as a sovereign nation.  There was much speculation 
that conservative factions within Iran purposefully were involved in the discovery of 
weapons en-route to the Palestinian territories, a discovery which may have tilted the 
scales towards Iran’s inclusion in the Axis of Evil.165  With the invasion and regime 
change in Iraq, conservatives like Khamenei grew in their belief that the eventual goal of 
the United States was regime change in Iran, which would obviously be unacceptable for 
Khamenei, the conservative clergy who support the velayat-e faqih, and the IRGC that 
depends on the support from the Iranian government for its economic and political 
influence. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In June 2005, Iran held its ninth presidential election of the post-Islamic 
Revolutionary era.  Khatami, unable to run due to consecutive term limits, was on the 
sideline with the battle waged between Tehran’s conservative mayor, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad and ex-President Rafsanjani.  The run-up to the 2005 Presidential election 
was marked with increasing conservative interference from the Guardian Council in 
barring numerous reformist candidates from the 2004 parliamentary election, which was 
in turn partially boycotted by reformist parliamentarians in protest leading to 
conservative take-over of the Iranian parliament.166  The Iranian electorate, ready for a 
change and leaning towards the conservative candidate who had tacit approval from 
Khamenei, rejected reformism and the more moderate Rafsanjani by nearly 2/3s of the 
vote.167 
This chapter has traced the growth of the IRGC’s economic power, the reassertion 
of conservative power by the various conservative institutions closely tied to the Supreme 
Leader, and the world events that led to the collapse of Khatami’s foreign policy 
ambitions and ultimately, the Iranian reform movement.  While sanctions did have a 
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significant effect on the IRGC’s economic growth, sanctions cannot be tied to the 
development of the Iranian system of government, which is mostly responsible for the 
ultimate failure of the Iranian reform movement.  Neither can sanctions be tied to the 
foreign affairs interactions between the United States and Iran that failed in the post-9/11 
era.  The effects of sanctions can be tied to the deeper underlying cause for sanctions, 
Iran’s nuclear program, in a rather self-fulfilling manner: it can be argued that sanctions 
drove Iranian desire for regional and international independence which they identified 
with a sovereign nuclear program, which in turn invited additional international scrutiny 
and sanctions due to lack of transparency. 
If read by itself, this chapter might lead one to believe that the effects of sanctions 
tilted Iran’s internal balance of power in favor of the conservatives.  However, this 
chapter must be taken into consideration with the previous evidence to determine what 
role, if any, did sanctions and their effects have on Iran’s domestic politics and the reform 
movement in particular. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. HOLISTIC EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON IRAN 
One of the goals of the Islamic Revolution was to establish a just economic 
society, taking issue with the centrally run economy of the Shah and the corruption it 
created.  What the sanctions have effectively done was create the economic framework 
where “elite group of clerics and their cronies” have control of major segments of the 
economy and industry, stifling private enterprise through both political and economic 
dominance, aided in part by the lack of foreign participation in Iran’s domestic 
economy.168  This thesis’ research question was whether international sanctions affected 
Iranian domestic politics, bringing about the political reform movement of the 1990s and 
the subsequent conservative resurgence and proposed three hypotheses to explain the 
effect of sanctions on Iran. 
1. Post-Islamic Revolution 
From the beginning of the Islamic Republic, Iran has faced substantial opposition 
from the United States, both economically and politically.  In order to secure its national 
economic assets, the revolutionary government under Khomeini nationalized and 
consolidated significant portions of the previous Iranian economy.169  Faced with 
international isolation, due to both internal politics and international response, Iran was 
forced by its existential struggle against Iraq in the 1980s to develop its indigenous 
weapons production as it was barred from its former primary weapons and munitions 
supplier.170  This effect of sanctions on Iran’s ability to purchase weapons on the 
international market led to the rise of Iran’s military-industrial complex, largely under the 
control of the IRGC and its ancillary organizations.  Furthermore, while the sanctions 
increased transactional costs on Iran’s foreign military purchases, Iran was still able to 
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participate in the international weapons market and even capitalized on corruption 
inherent in many sanctions regimes to do business with the imposer of the sanctions.171  
It can be well argued that U.S. sanctions on Iran following the creation of the Islamic 
Republic did hurt Iran in the short term by increasing transactional cost and hampering 
Iran’s ability to prosecute the Iran-Iraq War, but it can also be argued that the sanctions 
were a blessing in disguise for Iran, the Iranian clergy elites, and revolutionary 
conservatives as it forced Iran to rely on and develop its own industrial capacities.  With 
the IRGC in firm control of the industrial and economic infrastructure of Iran and the 
Iranian clergy led by Khomeini, and later Khamenei, firmly in control of the IRGC 
through informal (religious) and formal (Iranian constitution) sources of authority, the 
longevity of the Islamic Revolution was assured to proceed along the philosophical and 
legal framework outlined by Khomeini.  The enduring nature of the influence control 
over Iran’s industry and bonyads afforded Iranian conservatives, along with control over 
key institutions of the Iranian governmental structure like the Council of Guardians, and 
Expediency Council, essentially ensure Iranian conservatives ability to weather any 
reforms unacceptable to the Supreme Leader. 
2. Thermidor 
It was during the Iranian Thermidor period following the death of Khomeini that 
much of the conservatives’ ability to resist undesired change formalized.  Aided in part 
by a cooperative and thankful national government, the beginnings of “privatization,” its 
capabilities and experience from the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC and its subsidiary 
companies found themselves very well situated to cement their influence with both the 
populace and the economy.  With international trade following the Iran-Iraq War still in 
its infancy, the IRGC through its DIO companies and the Ghorb was able to gain 
significant domestic market shares that it might not have been able to cultivate had there 
been less international resistance, in the form of sanctions, to foreign investment in 
Iran.172  Indeed, valuable opportunities for American engagement in Iran’s booming 
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energy industry were lost as political expediency in the United States triumphed over 
possible engagement with Iran.  The Thermidor period also saw increased domestic 
corruption, in no small part due to the centralization and inefficiency of the IRGC’s 
companies.  This economic corruption led to public perceptions of governmental 
corruptions, perceptions that aided in the development of the Iranian reform movement as 
people yearned for more transparency in government after over a decade of deprivation.  
However, there is little empirical evidence that sanctions had any measurable effect on 
the development of the Iranian reform movement and this thesis has established that the 
reform movement appears to have been a completely internal development, born of the 
Iranian people’s desire for transparency in government, increased civil society, and 
personal civil rights—all long denied as the conservative Iranian clergy who supported 
Khomeini’s concept velayat-e faqih sought to establish a government faithful to their 
version of Islamic government.  Along with the effects of sanctions on the Iranian 
economy in the post-revolutionary period, sanctions during the Thermidor period did not 
immediately influence Iranian domestic politics, but rather further tilted the economic 
framework in favor of the IRGC and its industries. 
3. Reform and Conservative Resurgence 
Khatami’s stunning presidential election in 1997 was a huge opportunity for both 
the United States and Iran.  Khatami and the reform movement were in favor of expanded 
international engagement, and in fact, their internal domestic policy goals relied in large 
part on an effective and productive foreign policy.  However, in dealing with the United 
States and the West Khatami was not the sole voice of Iran.  The Supreme Leader, leery 
of interaction with the Great Satan, actively and passively through Iranian institutions 
answerable to him, stymied the ability of the Iranian government to react positively to 
American overtures but did allow for increased regional dialogue.173   
The main obstacle to the reform movement’s agenda was not even the effects of 
sanctions but the very nature of Iran’s governmental structure.  While the presidency and 
the parliament had significant power, no real change was possible without the consent of 
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the Supreme Leader through governmental institutions like the Guardian Council, 
Expediency Council, and judiciary answerable or appointed by him.  Informally, 
institutions like the IRGC and Basij militias continually and publically criticized the 
reformist movement with the tacit support and approval of the Khamenei-appointed 
judiciary.  Elections where not free and fair due to mass candidate nullification by the 
Guardian Council.  Sanctions were a factor in Iran’s economy, but not in the way that 
was intended by the United States.  Instead, sanctions became instrumental towards 
reinforcing the informal sources of conservative power by limiting foreign desire and 
ability to participate in the Iranian market. 
As the IRGC and its affiliated industries became more economically powerful, 
and the Iranian public did not feel the economic pressure intended by sanctions, the 
IRGC was able to slowly influence the Iranian electorate via public works and expansion 
of its penetration of Iranian society via the Basij militia network.  While conservatives 
were working to influence the public, the bonyads also exerted influence on the public by 
their donations and support of the Iranian populace.  As the Iranian populace saw little 
delivery by reformists on their promises, the populace grew increasingly disenchanted.  
 The straw that broke the camel’s back was Iran’s inclusion in the “Axis of Evil.”  
In a single speech, President Bush completely alienated the most important target 
audience of any effort to normalize relations: the Iranian conservative clergy who rule 
Iran.  Nearly completely discrediting reformists’ attempts to normalize relations, the 
United States’ new position regarding Iran’s status in the world forced reformists to 
abandon their previous international engagement goals, lest they be completely barred 
from Iranian politics by the conservative institutions within the Iranian governmental 
system capable of it.  Holding overwhelming economic and political influence, 
conservative elements like the IRGC increased their visible opposition to the reform 
movement.  In the 2004 parliamentary elections, and the 2005 presidential election, the 
Iranian electorate was ready for a change and when deprived of reformist candidates, they 




From the empirical evidence, in response to this thesis’ research question 
regarding sanctions and their effect on Iran’s domestic politics, there is support for all 
three of this thesis’ hypotheses.  However, a combination of hypotheses one and three is 
the most satisfying as there is more evidence of the effects of sanctions creating the 
economic framework by which conservatives created and maintained their power base 
and influence and evidence of the effects of sanctions on discrediting the reform 
movement, mainly by denying it the international engagement which would have been 
crucial towards the success of the reform movement.  While there is also evidence for this 
thesis’ second hypothesis of conservative elements within the Iranian governmental 
structure conducting international unacceptable behavior in regard to support for 
terroristic organizations and advancement of Iran’s nuclear program, it is a not a 
satisfying hypothesis due to the reform movement’s support of the Islamic Revolution, its 
exportation, and Iran’s sovereign right to develop a nuclear program.  While individuals 
within the reform movement may have wished, and even instituted, limited suspensions 
of international unacceptable behavior, the structure of Iran’s government precluded them 
from openly repudiating that behavior or risk being completely shut out of participation 
in Iranian government by conservative-dominated institutions legally empowered to 
maintain the Islamic Revolution.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES’ FUTURE 
ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN 
To put it succinctly, U.S. sanctions against Iraq between the period between 1979 
and 2005 were ineffective and reinforced the power of those within the Iranian 
governmental structure most opposed to interactions with the United States.  To expand 
on that statement, one can see the lack of sanctions’ effectiveness in the lack of true 
pressure on the Iranian public and government.  Economically, Iranian trade did suffer 
slightly in the 1990s due to the effect of sanctions, but the overall effect of sanctions 
between 1994 and 2000 was loss of less 0.11% of Iranian GDP.174  There was little to no 
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economic pressure or deprivation to the Iranian public as the Iranian government was 
able to maintain subsidies on commodities and there is even evidence that the IRGC 
facilitated smuggling rings in Iran bringing in Western goods, further lessening the 
impact of sanctions.175 
Sanctions in the 2000s have had more effect as the international community has 
worked in concert to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials in the post-9/11 world.  
As Iran continues to flout international norms, it has been subjected to increasingly 
severe economic sanctions but the regime in Tehran still shows no sign of weakness even 
in recent elections as the Council of Guardians and other conservative institutions have 
been able to stifle dissent, and even the Supreme Leader weighing on domestic politics as 
he did in the 2008 Iranian presidential election.  It is understandable that neither the West 
nor Iran has any great reason to trust one another, but the cycle of increasing sanctions 
has so far not yielded appreciable results, neither in attempting to affect Iran’s ability to 
develop a nuclear program nor on exerting overwhelming financial pressure on the 
Iranian electorate. 
As a result, it appears clear that a new paradigm is required in engaging Iran.  For 
this to occur, all parties must accept the following realities:  1) The United States cannot 
afford to project its power in the Middle East indefinitely.  The cost of maintaining its 
overwhelming military dominance worldwide is increasing difficult.  The rise of powers 
such as China, India, and Russia with the decline of military power of NATO will 
eventually leave the United States and its allies in a precarious situation.  It is in our best 
national interests to begin the process of limiting our exposure to as many potential 
conflict zones as possible in order to maintain our quantitative edge worldwide. 
2) It is in the best interest of all parties involved to reduce tensions in the Middle 
East.  With the advent of the 24-hour news cycle, every newsworthy development is 
 
                                                 
175Khalaji, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, Inc., accessed May 17, 2012. 
Julian Borger and Robert Tait, “The Financial Power of the Revolutionary Guards,” The Guardian, 
February 15, 2010, accessed May 17, 2012.  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/15/financial-
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repeatedly broadcast and sensationalized, destabilizing energy markets.  Effective 
engagement with Iran will lead to a decline in regional tensions, which will in turn serve 
to diminish potential economic spikes. 
3) While democratization in the Middle East appears to be on the rise, especially 
with the Arab Spring, American credibility as a partner is seriously compromised due to 
its history with Iran.  A sincere and frank acknowledgement by the United States of its 
role in Iran’s history and a unilateral gesture of diplomatic nature, such as easing of 
certain sanctions, is required to engage Iran.  It will not happen overnight, but there must 
be a basis of understanding between the two nations for any progress to occur.  One of 
the biggest obstacles to progress is the Western objection to Iran’s nuclear program.  It is 
time to acknowledge that Iran has a nuclear program and is entitled to it as a sovereign 
nation.  It is the threat of foreign objections that is partially to blame for how Iran 
developed its nuclear program.  As long as the regime sees a hostile foreign environment, 
seemingly intent on continually threatening the regime’s existence, they will continue to 
act outside of international norms.  The first step to coopting Iran’s government is to 
engage it and attempt to influence change through soft power. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Sanctions will always be the initial “go-to” diplomatic tool when dealing with a 
non-compliant state.  In many situations, merely the threat of economic repercussions is 
enough to convince a state to cease internationally unacceptable behavior.  However, the 
use of sanctions in cases where the target state possesses significant economic influence, 
especially as related to energy commodities, must be carefully considered.  The 
international economy is a zero-sum game and there will always be an outlet.  Sanctions 
may affect transactional costs, but in the face of a determined target who believes it is 
facing an existential threat, transactional costs are not enough to affect change.  Such is 
the case in Iran. 
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